India and Bangladesh: The geography of strategic reality

New Delhi: History occasionally produces relationships that are not merely diplomatic but geographical, shaped less by political choice than by immutable strategic realities. India and Bangladesh exemplify one such relationship. Governments may change, political slogans may evolve, and public opinion may fluctuate, but geography remains remarkably indifferent to ideology. Sharing over 4,000 kilometres of border, 54 transboundary rivers, centuries of civilisational interaction, and deeply interconnected economic and security interests, the two nations remain bound by realities that no political narrative can rewrite.

Sections of Bangladesh's contemporary political discourse increasingly project a different picture. Anti-India rhetoric has become a recurring feature of domestic mobilisation, often framed around border issues, sovereignty, religion, or regional politics. While such narratives may generate immediate political dividends, they often obscure a more fundamental truth: Bangladesh's long-term stability and prosperity remain deeply intertwined with constructive engagement with India. Geography has already settled what politics continues to debate.

The relationship between India and Bangladesh rests on civilisational links that long predate modern political borders. Before the Partition of 1947, Bengal was a shared cultural and linguistic space where Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims lived, traded and created a common literary and cultural tradition. The division of Bengal and the creation of East Pakistan transformed that shared civilisational space into an international frontier, but not the deep social, cultural and economic connections across it.

As the political crisis in East Pakistan escalated into the Liberation War of 1971, India became increasingly involved. Nearly 10 million refugees sought shelter across its borders, creating an unprecedented humanitarian and security challenge. Pakistan's air strikes on Indian airfields in December 1971 transformed the crisis into a full-scale war.

India's role during Bangladesh's Liberation War was not merely a military intervention but the beginning of a partnership that has gradually evolved into one of South Asia's most significant bilateral relationships. Over the decades, cooperation has expanded well beyond regional security. Unlike relationships driven solely by diplomatic convenience, India-Bangladesh ties have increasingly become institutionalised through shared infrastructure and mutual dependence.

Perhaps nowhere is this interdependence more evident than in the energy sector. India exports approximately 1,200 MW of electricity to Bangladesh through cross-border transmission links, accounting for a significant share of Bangladesh's peak electricity demand. The India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, capable of transporting one million metric tonnes of diesel annually, has further strengthened Bangladesh's fuel security. Water presents an equally compelling example. Of Bangladesh's 57 transboundary rivers, 54 originate in India, making upstream cooperation indispensable. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty continues to provide predictable dry-season flows that remain vital for Bangladesh's agriculture, ecology and livelihoods.

The same pattern is visible across infrastructure. Bangladesh today is the largest recipient of Indian concessional development financing, with nearly US$8 billion extended through Lines of Credit. These investments have not been symbolic diplomatic gestures. They have financed railway modernisation, roads, bridges, inland waterways, integrated check posts, port connectivity and cross-border logistics that facilitate trade while reducing transportation costs. Projects such as the Akhaura-Agartala Rail Link and the Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line strengthen not only bilateral commerce but Bangladesh's aspiration to emerge as a regional connectivity hub linking South and Southeast Asia.

Security cooperation has followed a similarly pragmatic trajectory. Defence cooperation expanded significantly following the agreements signed in 2017, encompassing military training, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism cooperation and joint exercises such as Exercise SAMPRITI. These initiatives are not directed against any third country; rather, they strengthen Bangladesh's own ability to confront cross-border militancy, terrorism financing, illegal arms trafficking and organised criminal networks. In a region where security threats increasingly transcend borders, cooperation has become less a matter of political preference than of operational necessity.

The 2015 implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement demonstrated what mature diplomacy can achieve. For decades, the enclaves along the India-Bangladesh border represented one of the world's most complicated territorial anomalies, creating administrative uncertainty and opportunities for criminal exploitation. Their peaceful resolution transformed a chronic security challenge into an enduring example of political statesmanship, improving governance, border management and the everyday lives of thousands of people on both sides.

Beyond strategy and economics lies an equally important human dimension. Every year, hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis travel to India seeking specialised medical care in fields ranging from oncology and cardiology to neurology and organ transplantation. Before the pandemic, India issued nearly 1.5 million visas annually to Bangladeshi citizens, making Bangladesh one of the largest recipients of Indian visas worldwide. During the Covid-19 crisis, India supplied more than two million doses of Covishield vaccines, helping launch Bangladesh's national vaccination programme. Even during the Ukraine conflict, India evacuated Bangladeshi citizens under Operation Ganga alongside its own nationals.

Such episodes illustrate that the relationship extends beyond diplomacy into humanitarian responsibility.

This extensive cooperation makes the growing anti-India discourse in sections of Bangladesh's political landscape particularly striking. Legitimate disagreements between neighbouring countries are neither unusual nor unexpected. Border management, migration, water sharing and trade disputes will continue to arise. However, these issues increasingly risk being absorbed into broader ideological campaigns that portray India not as a partner but as a strategic adversary. Such narratives may resonate within domestic politics, yet they often fail to acknowledge the structural realities that underpin Bangladesh's own development.

The growing anti-India narrative cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider geopolitical environment. Any weakening of India-Bangladesh relations inevitably creates space for external actors whose strategic interests do not always align with regional stability.

Pakistan has historically sought to exploit anti-India sentiment and ideological networks across South Asia as part of its broader strategic calculus, while China increasingly views Bangladesh through the prism of regional influence, economic leverage and strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal. Their methods differ, but both stand to gain from any weakening of the India-Bangladesh partnership.

Yet the larger reality remains unchanged. Neither ideological mobilisation nor external influence can alter the fundamentals of geography.

No external power can replicate India's geographical proximity, shared river systems, integrated energy networks, expanding connectivity corridors or immediate stake in Bangladesh's peace, stability and prosperity. These are advantages created not by diplomacy alone, but by geography itself.

In the end, geography does not negotiate. It continues to shape the choices that politics can only temporarily contest.

(The writer is an author and columnist. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS