New Delhi, Aug 2 (SocialNews.XYZ) In Hindu philosophy, there is a belief that everything happens for a reason. If that thought holds, the Cockroach Janta Party (CJP) protest at Delhi's Jantar Mantar has served a purpose far greater than drawing attention to examination paper leaks. It has exposed deep cracks in institutions, the erosion of civility, the weakening of family values and the ease with which sections of the youth could be drawn into outrage, abuse and manipulation.

Long after the slogans have faded, these are the questions that should concern the country the most.

It exposed an examination system that has been rotting for decades, corroded from within by those entrusted with protecting it. It exposed the erosion of the stature once enjoyed by teachers in Indian society. It exposed coaching institutes that increasingly view education as a business rather than a responsibility. It exposed sections of the political ecosystem that are quick to exploit emotions of young people. And perhaps most importantly, it exposed the gradual decline of family values and parenting, leaving many teenagers vulnerable to manipulation and the lure of instant fame.

The CJP protest, therefore, should be seen as a wake-up call -- not just for governments, but for politicians, parents and the youth themselves.

Prime Minister Narendra Modi chose to respond in a manner that went beyond politics. Through a series of social media videos, he attempted to engage directly with young people, projecting himself as the head of a large national family concerned about the direction in which a section of the younger generation is heading.

His first Instagram video on July 23, when the CJP-led protests were still underway, announced fast-track courts to hear paper leak cases and promised legislation prescribing stricter punishment for those involved. A day later, he thanked young people for sending thoughtful suggestions in response to the video, saying his relationship with them would only grow stronger.

On July 26, the Prime Minister announced that a task force headed by Infosys co-founder Nandan Nilekani would study India's examination system and recommend comprehensive reforms. He later followed it up with another video explaining the Public Examination (Prevention of Unfair Means) Amendment Bill, 2026.

However, it was his July 31 message that stood apart.

Beginning with the words, "Hi friends, today I feel like talking only to you", the Prime Minister adopted a deeply personal tone. Referring to the abusive language directed at him and his late mother during the protests, he said the words did not belong in a civilised society and that seeing "daughters" use such language came as a cultural shock.

Instead of demanding harsh punishment, he urged society to view the episode differently. Young people make mistakes, he said, and youth is also the stage when those mistakes can be corrected. Rather than dragging them through endless court proceedings or socially isolating them, society should embrace them and help them find the right path, he said.

To drive home the point, he used a simple analogy of tongue and teeth, saying that the teeth may bite the tongue and it might bleed. "But we do not break the teeth. Both the teeth and the tongue are ours. These youngsters are ours too, and guiding them is our responsibility, " he said.

It was a message that combined firmness with compassion. The July 31 address demonstrated how a leader can respond to a sensitive issue involving young people without reducing it to a purely political contest.

The real test, however, does not lie with the government alone. It lies equally with the opposition and with society.

Throughout the paper leak controversy and the CJP agitation, the opposition failed to convert a genuine public concern into a meaningful national debate.

Instead of engaging seriously with examination reforms, institutional accountability and the future of India's students, much of the discourse descended into political theatrics. Parliament, too, failed to rise to the occasion. Even Rahul Gandhi, who has consistently tried to position himself as a voice of students and the youth, could not offer a substantive agenda. A serious issue eventually got reduced to exchanges over who called whom an "idiot".

But the biggest lesson from the CJP protest is for society itself.

Young people will question authority. They should. Curiosity, idealism, adventurous rebellion are natural characteristics of youth; there is nothing wrong with that. But the real concern arises when that energy is easily hijacked by vested interests pursuing political or personal agendas.

The protests also revealed an uncomfortable reality. Some participants appeared more interested in creating viral content than contributing to a meaningful movement. The abusive language directed at the Prime Minister and his late mother reflected a disturbing coarsening of public discourse. Equally troubling were reports that, in pursuit of better camera angles and social media engagement, some participants were even directing Sonam Wangchuk during his fast to change his position for better visuals.

Such incidents point to a deeper societal problem. Has the pursuit of online popularity begun to overshadow dignity, respect and purpose? Have likes, reels and followers become more important than values?

These are questions that deserve far greater attention than the political slugfest surrounding the protest.

The protest has ended. The protesters have gone home. But the fallout is immense, an eye-opener for society, politicians and the youth themselves.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 29 (SocialNews.XYZ) There are soldiers who become legends because of the battles they fight. Then there are those whose legacy lives on in every battle fought by others. Brigadier Basant K. Ponwar belonged to that rare second category.

For an entire generation of police officers, commandos and young military leaders, he was more than an instructor. He was the man who changed the way India understood jungle warfare. Long before the tide turned against Left Wing Extremism, when vast stretches of central India were considered almost impenetrable, and the Maoists dictated the rhythm of the conflict, Brigadier Ponwar realised that conventional thinking would never produce unconventional victories.

His philosophy was disarmingly simple.

“Fight a guerrilla like a guerrilla.”

It was not merely a slogan. It became a doctrine.

It demanded that the security forces abandon predictable patterns and instead learn to think, move and survive as their adversary did. It meant travelling light, mastering the terrain, operating in small teams, relying on intelligence rather than brute force and treating every inch of the jungle with respect. To Brigadier Ponwar, the forest was not an obstacle to be crossed; it was a battlefield that had to be understood.

Those ideas would go on to reshape India’s approach to the counter-insurgency.

When he established the Counter Terrorism and Jungle Warfare College (CTJWC) at Kanker (Chhattisgarh), he was not merely setting up another training institution. He was laying the foundation for a new way of fighting a war that had already consumed thousands of lives.

The jungles of Bastar do not forgive mistakes.

A moment’s lapse in concentration, a poorly chosen route or an inability to read the terrain can prove fatal. Brigadier Ponwar knew this better than most. Every exercise he designed, every patrol he supervised and every lesson he taught had one purpose: to ensure that the men who entered those forests returned home alive.

For him, training was never about passing a course.

It was about saving lives.

Thousands of personnel from the CRPF, state police forces, specialised anti-Naxal units, Greyhounds, C-60, District Reserve Guard and other security organisations passed through the gates of CTJWC. They came from different states, spoke different languages and wore different uniforms. But they left with something that united them—a common doctrine shaped by Brigadier Ponwar’s experience, discipline, and uncompromising standards.

Many of the officers who would later lead successful operations across Chhattisgarh, Maharashtra, Telangana, Odisha and Jharkhand may never have realised that the instincts guiding their decisions had been forged on the training grounds of Kanker.

His influence travelled with them.

Every silent patrol.

Every successful ambush.

Every life saved because a young officer remembered a lesson learnt, years earlier.

That became Brigadier Ponwar’s unseen battlefield.

The story of India’s campaign against Maoist insurgency is often narrated through dramatic encounters, surrendered leaders and decisive operations. Those stories deserve to be told. But behind every successful operation stands an invisible army of trainers who prepare others for the day when theory meets reality.

Brigadier Ponwar was one of the finest among them.

He believed that realism in training was an act of compassion. If a trainee struggled during an exercise, he would learn. If he made the same mistake during an operation, someone might not return home. That philosophy demanded high standards, relentless discipline and physical endurance, but it also reflected something deeply human—a profound respect for the lives of those he trained.

There is perhaps no greater tribute that can be paid to an instructor than this: generations of soldiers and policemen walked into danger carrying lessons that had once been taught by him.

As India gradually regained control over regions that had remained trapped in decades of violence, many factors contributed to that success - better intelligence, improved coordination between agencies, courageous leadership, technological advances and the extraordinary sacrifice of countless security personnel. Yet beneath all these achievements lay another truth.

Victories are not won only on the battlefield.

They are first won on the training ground.

That was Brigadier Ponwar’s battlefield.

He rarely sought the spotlight. His greatest satisfaction lay not in personal recognition but in watching others succeed. The medals earned by those he trained, the operations they completed and, most importantly, the lives they brought back safely became the quiet measure of his own success.

History often celebrates the commanders who lead from the front.

It should also remember the teacher who prepared them to do so.

Brigadier Basant K. Ponwar did more than train men for war. He gave them the confidence to confront fear, the wisdom to respect the jungle and the discipline to survive it. In doing so, he left behind something far greater than an institution.

He left behind a way of thinking - A doctrine. A generation of jungle warriors. And a legacy that will continue to echo through India’s forests long after the sound of gunfire has faded.

(The writer is an author and columnist)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 27 (SocialNews.XYZ) The recent student congregation at Jantar Mantar in New Delhi was not merely a protest over an examination controversy. It was a moment of political and social awakening that deserves to be understood beyond the immediate issue. The students may eventually return to their classrooms, but Jantar Mantar has entered their collective consciousness. It has become more than a place; it has become a symbol.

The phrase Jantar Mantar itself carries a deeper metaphor. While historically it is India’s celebrated astronomical observatory, in popular imagination, the words evoke both jantar (an instrument) and mantra (a force or invocation). Democracy, too, functions through such a combination. Institutions are its instruments, but the people’s voice is its mantra. When the institutions fail to transmit that voice, the mantra returns to the streets.

That is precisely what happened.

Beyond an Examination

The immediate trigger may have been allegations of examination irregularities, but the movement rapidly transcended the issue of one examination. It reflected something much larger—the anxiety of India’s middle class and lower middle class whose dreams are built upon education, merit, and opportunity.

Unlike many earlier political agitations, this movement had no obvious ideological leadership. There was no single political party directing it, no caste mobilisation, no religious slogan defining it. Students travelled voluntarily from small towns and cities across India, often at their own expense. They represented families that have invested everything in education because they believe it is the only path to dignity and social mobility.

When that path appears uncertain, the insecurity becomes existential.

The protest therefore became not merely about an examination but about trust in institutions.

Why Jantar Mantar Matters

Every democracy requires a space where ordinary citizens can be heard before frustration turns into alienation. The Parliament is constitutionally that space. Political parties are expected to amplify public concerns. Ministers are expected to respond. Bureaucracy is expected to resolve problems before they become crises.

When these channels appear inadequate, citizens naturally seek another platform.

Jantar Mantar became that platform.

The significance of this development lies in the fact that thousands of young Indians felt their concerns were not reaching the establishment through normal democratic mechanisms. Their gathering was not an attempt to replace the Parliament. Rather, it was a reminder that democracy cannot be confined within the Parliament alone.

Governments are elected by parliamentary majorities, but they continue to govern through public confidence. Numbers inside the Parliament cannot permanently substitute for communication outside it.

A Different Kind of Student Movement

India has witnessed powerful student movements before. The Navnirman Movement in Gujarat, the Bihar movement led by Jayaprakash Narayan, and numerous regional agitations shaped the country’s political evolution. Those movements arose largely from political and regional contexts.

The present movement carries a different character.

Its foundation is aspiration rather than ideology.

Today’s students are digital natives. They are connected through technology rather than traditional organisational structures. They form communities without regard to caste, religion, or regional identities. Social media enabled mobilisation, but the movement gained legitimacy only when students left their mobile screens and occupied public space peacefully.

This marks a significant generational shift.

Their concerns are practical rather than doctrinal. They are asking simple questions: Will merit matter? Will institutions remain credible? Will education secure employment? Will governments listen?

These questions cut across every social divide.

The Middle Class Cannot Be Ignored

Much of India’s developmental discourse understandably focuses on poverty alleviation and rural development. Yet the aspirations of modern India are largely carried by its middle class.

India’s scientists, engineers, teachers, civil servants, armed forces officers, entrepreneurs, doctors, and innovators overwhelmingly emerge from middle-class and lower middle-class families. These are families that save for education, sacrifice for opportunity and believe in hard work more than privilege.

If this section begins to lose confidence in public institutions, the consequences extend far beyond urban politics.

The middle class does not merely influence elections. It shapes national sentiment, technological innovation, administrative capacity, and economic productivity.

Its anxieties therefore deserve careful attention—not because it is politically louder, but because it remains central to India’s long-term development.

Listening Is the First Duty of Governance

Every government naturally seeks stability and efficient administration. But good governance requires something more than administrative control. It requires constant listening.

Constructive criticism should never automatically be viewed as hostility. History repeatedly demonstrates that societies become stronger when governments hear uncomfortable voices early rather than dismiss them as politically motivated.

During the Emergency, public grievances were often attributed to conspiracies or external influences. History ultimately judged that approach harshly. Democracies flourish not by eliminating dissent but by engaging with it.

This responsibility extends equally to ministers and the bureaucracy.

An administration that merely follows instructions without independent initiative gradually loses contact with public reality. Citizens can sense this distance. Their frustrations accumulate quietly until they eventually surface in unexpected forms.

Jantar Mantar is one such reminder.

The Future Lies with India’s Youth

The greatest mistake would be to see this protest only through the lens of education.

The next major challenge may well be employment.

India’s demographic strength can become either its greatest advantage or its greatest vulnerability. The government alone cannot generate sufficient employment. The solution lies in innovation, entrepreneurship, research and partnerships between academia, industry, and government.

Every university should have innovation and incubation centres where students work on real national challenges—from energy security and artificial intelligence to water management, waste-to-energy technologies, agriculture, and healthcare.

Young Indians should not merely prepare for jobs; they should be encouraged to create solutions.

In emerging technologies such as Artificial Intelligence, India may not match the financial investments of larger economies, but it possesses an enormous advantage in human talent. By focusing on practical applications, ethical frameworks and socially relevant innovation, Indian students can make distinctive global contributions.

The Mantra Must Continue

The true significance of Jantar Mantar is not that thousands gathered there for a few days. Its significance lies in reminding the nation that democracy is ultimately sustained by participation, not silence.

India’s civilisational strength has always rested on diversity of thought, freedom of philosophical inquiry and the acceptance of disagreement. For thousands of years, this civilisation has encouraged dialogue over conformity and debate over unquestioning obedience. Modern democracy in India draws strength from that much older tradition.

The students have now dispersed. The placards have disappeared. The slogans have faded.

But the questions remain.

Jantar Mantar has ceased to be merely a geographical location. It has become a democratic conscience. Wise governments will recognise it not as a challenge to authority but as an early warning system—a place where the pulse of the Republic becomes audible before discontent hardens into distrust.

Conclusion

The recent congregation of students at Jantar Mantar should ultimately be remembered not as a moment of confrontation, but as a powerful affirmation of the resilience and credibility of Indian democracy.

Far from exposing institutional weakness, it demonstrated the remarkable capacity of our democratic system to absorb public sentiment, initiate dialogue and respond with flexibility. The sight of senior ministers personally reaching out to fasting students, inviting them for discussions and responding to their legitimate concerns reflected a democratic culture where the highest levels of government remain accessible to the ordinary citizen.

This is India’s greatest strength.

When institutions or bureaucracy fail to adequately address public grievances, the people still possess constitutional spaces where their voice can travel directly to the highest authority.

Jantar Mantar has evolved into one such democratic bridge -- not against the Parliament, but in support of its larger purpose of representing the people. In a world where student movements are often met with prolonged repression or violent suppression, India’s experience offers a different lesson: that dialogue is stronger than force, and responsiveness is stronger than rigidity.

Indian democracy cannot remain confined only to electoral mandates or parliamentary numbers; it draws its enduring legitimacy from continuous engagement with the aspirations of its citizens. Equally, this episode serves as a timely reminder to governments, ministers and the bureaucracy that dissent is not necessarily an act of defiance -- it is often the earliest indicator of public expectations and should be interpreted with sensitivity rather than suspicion.

The true strength of governance lies not in silencing criticism but in listening to it with humility. If Jantar Mantar has become the people’s democratic conscience, it is because it reminds every government that the authority to govern is constantly renewed through dialogue, empathy and trust. That is not a weakness of the Republic; it is the living spirit of India’s democracy and one of its greatest civilisational strengths.

The world has seen the strength of India’s democracy through direct dialogue of students from the street to the highest level of governance.

(The author is a former diplomat and a strategic affairs expert. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 26 (SocialNews.XYZ) It should never have taken a street protest to force governments to address a problem that has plagued India's examination system for many decades. But that is precisely what the Cockroach Janata Party's (CJP) protest at Jantar Mantar in Delhi has exposed.

The protest, though projected as an agitation against examination paper leaks and carrying an unmistakable political hue, has brought to the fore a problem that has plagued the country for decades.

Year after year, India has witnessed discrepancies in examinations. Sometimes paper leaks were detected; perhaps many more went unnoticed and unaddressed. One can only imagine how many doctors, engineers, policemen and other public servants may have secured their positions through unfair means. Every time a leak surfaced, the routine response was to cancel the examination and conduct a retest. That has been the story for decades.

This time, however, students have had enough; their anger forced the government to act, something that should have happened long ago without public pressure.

It was in 1986, under the Rajiv Gandhi government, that the National Policy on Education (NPE) formally acknowledged examination malpractices as a serious threat to academic integrity. It recognised systemic vulnerabilities, noting that everything from evaluation bias to the physical security of question papers required urgent attention. The policy laid the conceptual groundwork for treating paper leaks as a major security issue affecting students, but a comprehensive central law to deal with organised paper-leak syndicates never materialised.

None of the political parties or governments at the Centre that followed seriously attempted to plug these loopholes. Since 1986, Congress remained in power or was in coalition for nearly 23 years until 2014, yet it failed to address the menace through a dedicated legal framework.

It was only in 2024, after nationwide outrage over repeated leaks in major entrance examinations, that India enacted its first dedicated anti-paper leak law -- the Public Examinations (Prevention of Unfair Means) Act, 2024. The law came into force on June 21, 2024, specifically targeting central testing agencies.

Despite the new legislation, paper leaks have continued, with the 2026 NEET paper leak becoming the latest flashpoint.

The CJP, a collective of young people reportedly backed by the Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) and projecting itself as the voice of Gen Z, found an opportunity in the growing public anger. With activist Sonam Wangchuk sitting on a hunger strike at Jantar Mantar, the protest acquired momentum and threatened to snowball into a nationwide movement.

The agitation, which turned violent and reportedly left nearly 200 policemen and dozens of protesters injured, should serve as a wake-up call not merely for the government but for the entire political establishment.

Whether certain political forces attempted to fuel the protests or derail them through violence is a separate debate. What cannot be ignored is the deep frustration among the country's youth over a system repeatedly compromised by examination leaks.

For far too long, India's political class has taken people for granted. Fundamental issues have often been overshadowed by the compulsions of electoral politics. Even today, most parties continue to view such issues primarily through the prism of vote-bank calculations.

Take the NEET paper leak as an example. The controversy surfaced in April, but Congress became visibly active only after the CJP protests gathered a certain momentum and Sonam Wangchuk's agitation began attracting public support. Rahul Gandhi, returning after a 20-day foreign tour, suddenly made the issue a political priority as Parliament's Monsoon Session approached. He held special media events, including one near the Prime Minister's residence, to underline his party's concern.

AAP national convenor Arvind Kejriwal, widely perceived as the force behind the CJP, also faces uncomfortable questions. His party's government in Punjab has repeatedly been accused of failing to curb examination scandals in the state. It is alleged that six paper leaks have taken place over the past four years.

The Congress, the Shiromani Akali Dal and the BJP have all accused the Punjab government of recruitment irregularities and repeated examination leaks, demanding the resignation of Education Minister Harjot Singh Bains. Interestingly, whenever CJP leaders are questioned about the Punjab paper leaks, they conveniently sidestep the issue.

The Samajwadi Party, too, has been vocal over the present controversy. But it was the Mulayam Singh Yadav government that abolished Uttar Pradesh's stringent Anti-Copying Act in 1994. The law had been introduced in 1992 by the BJP government led by Chief Minister Kalyan Singh to curb rampant cheating in examinations. After assuming office, the Samajwadi Party repealed it, describing it as excessively harsh on students.

Then, in 2015, when Mulayam Singh Yadav's son Akhilesh Yadav was the Chief Minister, it took the intervention of the Allahabad High Court to force the removal of Uttar Pradesh Public Service Commission chairman Anil Yadav.

Anil Yadav was accused of favouring one particular community in recruitment to various government posts. Students repeatedly agitated against him, and several protests ended in police lathi-charge. He also courted controversy after the 2015 PCS (Preliminary) examination paper leak.

Whatever forces may have helped propel the CJP protest, the agitation has undoubtedly shaken the system and compelled the government to respond.

The real lesson from the CJP protests is not about one organisation or one government. It is about a political culture that responds only when public anger spills onto the streets. A system that waits for protests before correcting its failures is not merely inefficient; it has already failed the very people it is meant to serve.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 19 (SocialNews.XYZ) Every nation fights a battle for the imagination of its youth, and the same is happening in India also. But the real question is -- what kind of future are young Indians being encouraged to dream of?

Recently, a handwritten postcard carrying the words 'Vande Mataram' travelled into space aboard Skyroot's Vikram-1 rocket. Asked why he had chosen that message, Prime Minister Narendra Modi said this year marks the 150th anniversary of the national song and that Vande Mataram has always inspired India's youth.

The symbolism could hardly have been more striking. India celebrated two milestones -- the country's hydrogen-powered train and Vikram-1, a privately built rocket developed by a team of young engineers, most of them under the age of 28. Together, they conveyed a powerful message: when given the right opportunity, Indians, particularly the youth, are capable of building, innovating and competing with the best in the world.

But at the very same time, another contest has been unfolding in the national capital. At Jantar Mantar, attempts have been underway to channel the anger of young aspirants over paper leaks into a larger political movement.

This raises a larger question that goes beyond one protest or one political party.

The paper leak issue is undoubtedly serious. The NEET-UG 2026 controversy has shaken the confidence of lakhs of students and their families. It deserves neither trivialisation nor political point-scoring. But it is equally true that paper leaks are not a recent phenomenon. They have plagued India's examination system for decades. What successive governments failed to do was create a robust mechanism capable of dismantling the networks that flourished within the system itself.

When the teacher becomes the thief, the system stands compromised. More importantly, it reflects the country's social, political and moral condition. Such a system has existed for nearly 78 years, with the Congress party being in power for much of that period. Today, Rahul Gandhi is organising events around paper leaks to target the present government. He appears keen to tap into the sentiments of Gen Z in an attempt to build a larger political movement ahead of the 2029 Lok Sabha elections and the Assembly elections due before that, including in Punjab and Uttar Pradesh.

After spending nearly 20 days abroad, Rahul Gandhi has also sought to regain political visibility ahead of the Monsoon Session of Parliament. Interestingly, he and his party stayed away from Sonam Wangchuk's hunger strike at Jantar Mantar, which began on June 28, but decided to show solidarity as the Parliament session drew closer. Senior Congress leaders were seen at the protest site, and Rahul Gandhi also posted on social media after Wangchuk was shifted to the hospital.

For nearly the first fortnight, there was no significant mobilisation in Wangchuk's support, with many gatherings at Jantar Mantar revolving around food, selfies and making reels. None of the major opposition parties -- Congress, Samajwadi Party, Trinamool Congress, AAP or others -- asked their youth wings to stage a sustained protest at the iconic demonstration site in the heart of Delhi. However, they made a beeline for the venue once it became clear that administrative intervention could follow the Delhi High Court's July 16 order directing the authorities to do whatever was necessary to save Wangchuk's life.

After Wangchuk was shifted to the hospital, opposition leaders, including Rahul Gandhi, became vocal in attacking the government.

The paper leak issue is undoubtedly a serious concern and deserves to be dealt with firmly. The recent arrests in the NEET paper leak case have exposed the depth of the racket. Those entrusted with safeguarding the system are the very people accused of betraying it.

The growing demand for structural reforms is therefore justified. The government must ensure that examinations become secure, transparent and beyond manipulation. That alone will restore the confidence of students whose careers depend on a fair system.

Democracy will always have protests, and rightly so. Young people have every reason to question governments, demand accountability and seek justice. But there is a difference between encouraging young minds to seek reform and encouraging them to believe that agitation alone is the path to change.

The contrast before India's youth today is striking. On one hand are young scientists, engineers and entrepreneurs pushing technological frontiers. On the other hand is an attempt to define youth politics primarily through anger and confrontation. Both are messages competing for the attention of the same generation.

The success of Vikram-1 is more than a private space achievement. It demonstrates that Indian talent can create technologies that only a handful of private companies across the world have mastered. The hydrogen-powered train similarly reflects an ambition to build cleaner and more advanced public infrastructure. These achievements are not merely technological milestones; they are expressions of national confidence.

It was therefore fitting that among Vikram-1's symbolic payloads was a handwritten postcard bearing the words Vande Mataram. The phrase has inspired generations of Indians during different phases of the country's journey. The message accompanying the mission was unmistakable: inspire young Indians to build rather than merely react.

Ultimately, the future of the country will not be decided only inside Parliament or at protest sites. It will be shaped in laboratories, classrooms, startups, universities, factories and research centres, where millions of young Indians quietly pursue ideas that can transform the nation.

The battle before India today is not simply political. It is a battle for the imagination of its youth.

Those who succeed will not necessarily be the ones who shout the loudest, make headlines or draw the largest crowds. They will be the ones who convince young Indians that their greatest contribution to the nation lies not merely in protesting against its failures, but in building its future.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 12 (SocialNews.XYZ) Is it a coincidence that Dr Farooq Abdullah, former Chief Minister of Jammu and Kashmir and president of the ruling National Conference, has decided to stage a protest in Delhi demanding the restoration of statehood?

The timing certainly invites scrutiny. Barely days after a letter surfaced in which Abdullah was among the signatories urging New Delhi and Islamabad to end their "prolonged hostility", arguing that it was denying millions of young people opportunities, prosperity and a secure future, he wrote to 52 prominent political leaders inviting them to join a protest at Jantar Mantar on July 20, the opening day of the Monsoon Session of Parliament.

The invitees include almost the entire Opposition spectrum and his INDIA bloc allies -- Sonia Gandhi, Rahul Gandhi, Mamata Banerjee, Akhilesh Yadav, C. Joseph Vijay, Sharad Pawar, Uddhav Thackeray, Naveen Patnaik, Asaduddin Owaisi, Arvind Kejriwal, CPI(M) General Secretary M.A. Baby and several others. BJP leaders from Jammu and Kashmir have also been invited.

But the most striking name on the list is that of Hurriyat Conference chairman Mirwaiz Umar Farooq.

The sequence of events comes at a time when Jammu and Kashmir has largely remained peaceful since the abrogation of Article 370 on August 5, 2019. Security challenges remain, but the Valley has witnessed a degree of stability that had eluded it for decades.

The protest call also coincides with the deteriorating situation in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK), where public unrest against the Pakistani establishment has intensified.

Reports suggest that protesters have faced a sweeping crackdown by Pakistani security forces, with dozens of people reportedly killed. Residents have complained of shortages of food, fuel and medicines following what local leaders describe as an economic blockade. Sardar Aman Khan, leader of the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC), has even appealed to New Delhi to send humanitarian assistance and open the Line of Control for relief.

For Pakistan's establishment, the unrest in PoK has become an embarrassment. At a time when it is facing criticism over its handling of the region, peace in Jammu and Kashmir only sharpens the contrast. Over the past few years, attempts to push terrorists across the border, revive militancy and create fresh disturbances have repeatedly been foiled by Indian security forces. Several infiltration bids have failed, while plans to create terror modules in different parts of the country have also been neutralised.

The Valley itself has shown encouraging signs of recovery. Tourist arrivals, which had dipped sharply after the April 22, 2025 Pahalgam terror attack and the subsequent Operation Sindoor, have steadily picked up again. Businesses have revived, markets are bustling once more, and normal life has largely returned.

It is against this backdrop that Abdullah's protest call assumes significance.

There is, of course, nothing objectionable about organising a peaceful protest. That is the essence of democracy. What raises eyebrows, however, is the decision to invite the Hurriyat Conference, an organisation long associated with separatist politics. Though much of its leadership has either been jailed, sidelined or has died, those who remain, including Mirwaiz Umar Farooq, have consistently favoured engagement with Pakistan and international intervention on the Kashmir issue.

Equally noteworthy has been the Mirwaiz's response to the developments in PoK. His comments have been measured, calling for "engagement and peaceful redressal", but he has neither demanded protests against Pakistan nor sought international attention for the plight of the people there.

The silence has not been confined to the Hurriyat. Farooq Abdullah, Omar Abdullah, Mehbooba Mufti, and several other mainstream Kashmiri leaders have been far more restrained in reacting to reports of repression in PoK than they usually are while commenting on security operations within Jammu and Kashmir. At a time when several PoK leaders themselves have sought India's assistance, that silence has inevitably attracted attention.

Instead of championing the cause of the people suffering across the Line of Control, Kashmir's mainstream political leadership appears focused on mobilising opinion over statehood at a politically significant moment.

History also explains why many people view such developments with caution.

The years between 1988 and 1990 witnessed the rise of Pakistan-sponsored terrorism in Kashmir, targeted killings of those perceived to be pro-India and the forced exodus of Kashmiri Hindus. Dr Farooq Abdullah headed the government during much of that turbulent period. His administration failed in its primary duty of enforcing the rule of law as Pakistan-sponsored terrorism tightened its grip on the Valley.

It was during those years that terrorists were released from jail, a large section of the administration and police became compromised, and hundreds of young men crossed into Pakistan-occupied Kashmir for arms training before returning to unleash violence.

Farooq Abdullah's government never regained control of the situation. Why it failed, and how that failure altered the course of Kashmir's history, has never been adequately debated. A judicial commission or court of inquiry into the exodus of Kashmiri Hindus, the targeted killings of pro-India voices and the collapse of governance was never constituted. Consequently, many questions relating to the roles of the Abdullah leadership and the then Union Home Minister, the late Mufti Mohammad Sayeed, remain unanswered.

Decades later, Farooq Abdullah is preparing to lead a political mobilisation, this time at Jantar Mantar.

The timing and venue are difficult to ignore. The protest coincides with the opening day of Parliament's Monsoon Session, ensuring maximum political and media attention. Jantar Mantar is also the focal point of some other ongoing protests, including the one led by activist Sonam Wangchuk.

Whether Farooq Abdullah's protest call succeeds in turning the statehood demand into the dominant political narrative in the Union Territory, as the Abdullahs seek, or provokes the predictable reactions from Pakistan remains to be seen. The endorsement by Mirwaiz Umar Farooq also signals that the separatist, pro-Pakistan camp has chosen to back the exercise. The more important question, however, is how the people of Jammu and Kashmir respond.

Perhaps it is all just a coincidence. Perhaps it is simply a protest for statehood. But in Kashmir, where politics has often altered the course of history, timing is rarely dismissed as mere coincidence. That is why Farooq Abdullah's latest move deserves to be viewed with caution -- not because anyone questions his democratic right to protest, but because of the consequences it may have for a Valley that has paid dearly for political miscalculations in the past.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 12 (SocialNews.XYZ) Picture the scene. Perth, January 2008. India's special envoy has come seeking uranium for a power-starved nation of a billion people, from the country that sits atop the largest uranium reserves on earth. The answer is a flat no. Sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty first, India is told, or go home. India goes home.

Now cut to Melbourne, July 2026. The Prime Minister of Australia stands beside the Prime Minister of India, Narendra Modi, and announces that Australian uranium will fuel Indian reactors. No sermons this time. No demand for a signature, India has honourably declined for decades. Only the respect due to a responsible nuclear power. The same door that was shut on India's envoy is now held open for India's leader. Between those two frames lies the story of PM Modi's journey through Jakarta, Melbourne and Auckland. It is not a story of travel. It is a story of doors bolted against India for decades, now opening one after another.

The fuel they refused us

The uranium history deserves to be told fully, because memory is the first casualty of political convenience. In 2006, even as Washington embraced civil nuclear commerce with India, Canberra refused to follow. In 2008, Canberra reversed even its own earlier in-principle willingness. Through the entire UPA decade, the position was held. Delhi pleaded. Canberra declined. Australia, remarkably, kept discussing uranium sales to China while denying them to democratic India.

When UPA left office, not one gram of Australian uranium had a legal pathway to India. Within barely a hundred days of taking office, PM Modi signed the long-pending Civil Nuclear Cooperation Agreement in September 2014. This week in Melbourne, the final administrative lock was broken, and supply stands operationalised, fuelling India's march to one hundred gigawatts of nuclear power.

Understand what changed. Not India's stance on a treaty we rightly declined. The world's estimation of India changed, and the rules followed.

The defence arsenal finds its market

If Melbourne rewrote what India may buy, Jakarta rewrote what India now sells. For seventy years, our defence story was a buyer's story, written in queues outside foreign capitals. In Jakarta, the queue reversed.

India and Indonesia signed agreements for the supply of BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles, making Indonesia the third nation after the Philippines and Vietnam to stake its security on Indian steel, alongside a pact for Astra air-to-air missile systems. BrahMos carries the credibility of combat, proven in Operation Sindoor. And note the timing, for history rarely offers cleaner symbolism. Southeast Asia's largest economy surveyed a hardening neighbourhood and chose the Indian shield. That is not a transaction. That is a verdict.

Geography as strategy

The map agreed in Jakarta matters even more than the missiles. India will partner in developing Sabang Port at the mouth of the Malacca Strait, barely 160 kilometres from India's upcoming Great Nicobar transshipment hub. Two ports, two flags, one gateway commanding nearly a third of the world's trade. Cooperation deepens in critical minerals, with the nation holding nearly 60 per cent of the world's nickel.

President Prabowo conferred upon PM Modi the Bintang Adipurna, Indonesia's highest civilian and military honour. Then the Prime Minister travelled to Yogyakarta, to the thousand-year-old spires of Prambanan, where India will support the restoration of one of the great Hindu temples on this earth. Missiles for the present. Ports for the future. Temples for eternity. Only one statesman could have negotiated on all three registers in a single visit.

Trade at the speed of trust

The pattern runs through commerce too. The results are now arithmetic, not argument. Since the trade agreement of 2022, bilateral trade with Australia is up 55 per cent, and both Prime Ministers have ordered the full Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement concluded at the earliest. AustralianSuper announced an investment of half a billion Australian dollars in India even as PM Modi beckoned Australia's four trillion-dollar pension pool towards Indian infrastructure. Money is the most honest editorial page in the world. It has endorsed India.

Forty years ended in a morning

New Zealand tells the same story at a higher velocity. No Indian Prime Minister had visited in four decades. Trade talks had meandered without result since the UPA years. This government concluded a full Free Trade Agreement with a swiftness PM Modi called perhaps a global first. In Auckland, welcomed with the traditional Maori Powhiri, he crowned it with a new Strategic Partnership and a Roadmap to 2030 spanning maritime security, counter terrorism and cyber defence, a trade target of seven billion New Zealand dollars, and a mutual logistics pact between the Indian Navy and the New Zealand Defence Force.

An Indian warship may now provision in Auckland. Let that sentence settle. The Indian Navy's writ of friendship runs from the Gulf of Aden to the South Pacific.

One design, many doors

Set the outcomes side by side, and the design declares itself. Uranium refused for two decades now flows. Missiles India once imported are now exported. Trade pacts that gathered dust for years are concluded at a record pace. A nation once lectured about treaties is decorated with the highest honours of the very capitals that once said no.

None of this is an accident. None of it is atmospherics. It is the compound interest of 12 years of credibility, banked patiently and now drawn upon across half the planet. Nations do not decorate supplicants. They decorate those whose respect they seek. When the Prime Minister of Australia stands beside PM Modi before the largest gathering of Indian Australians ever assembled at Melbourne's Marvel Stadium, he is not extending courtesy. He is acknowledging gravity.

A closing thought

Centuries ago, the ships of Kalinga and the Cholas crossed these very waters carrying trade, faith and civilisation eastward. The stones of Prambanan still bear their signature. This week, the Indian Prime Minister retraced that ancient route, not with fleets of conquest but with instruments of partnership, and found every harbour open.

Doors do not open themselves. Someone must arrive with the standing to knock, the patience to persist, and the strength to be welcomed. For decades, the world kept India waiting on the threshold. PM Modi ended the wait. India no longer knocks on the world's doors. The world now holds them open.

(The author is a Senior Advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi: History occasionally produces relationships that are not merely diplomatic but geographical, shaped less by political choice than by immutable strategic realities. India and Bangladesh exemplify one such relationship. Governments may change, political slogans may evolve, and public opinion may fluctuate, but geography remains remarkably indifferent to ideology. Sharing over 4,000 kilometres of border, 54 transboundary rivers, centuries of civilisational interaction, and deeply interconnected economic and security interests, the two nations remain bound by realities that no political narrative can rewrite.

Sections of Bangladesh's contemporary political discourse increasingly project a different picture. Anti-India rhetoric has become a recurring feature of domestic mobilisation, often framed around border issues, sovereignty, religion, or regional politics. While such narratives may generate immediate political dividends, they often obscure a more fundamental truth: Bangladesh's long-term stability and prosperity remain deeply intertwined with constructive engagement with India. Geography has already settled what politics continues to debate.

The relationship between India and Bangladesh rests on civilisational links that long predate modern political borders. Before the Partition of 1947, Bengal was a shared cultural and linguistic space where Bengali-speaking Hindus and Muslims lived, traded and created a common literary and cultural tradition. The division of Bengal and the creation of East Pakistan transformed that shared civilisational space into an international frontier, but not the deep social, cultural and economic connections across it.

As the political crisis in East Pakistan escalated into the Liberation War of 1971, India became increasingly involved. Nearly 10 million refugees sought shelter across its borders, creating an unprecedented humanitarian and security challenge. Pakistan's air strikes on Indian airfields in December 1971 transformed the crisis into a full-scale war.

India's role during Bangladesh's Liberation War was not merely a military intervention but the beginning of a partnership that has gradually evolved into one of South Asia's most significant bilateral relationships. Over the decades, cooperation has expanded well beyond regional security. Unlike relationships driven solely by diplomatic convenience, India-Bangladesh ties have increasingly become institutionalised through shared infrastructure and mutual dependence.

Perhaps nowhere is this interdependence more evident than in the energy sector. India exports approximately 1,200 MW of electricity to Bangladesh through cross-border transmission links, accounting for a significant share of Bangladesh's peak electricity demand. The India-Bangladesh Friendship Pipeline, capable of transporting one million metric tonnes of diesel annually, has further strengthened Bangladesh's fuel security. Water presents an equally compelling example. Of Bangladesh's 57 transboundary rivers, 54 originate in India, making upstream cooperation indispensable. The 1996 Ganges Water Sharing Treaty continues to provide predictable dry-season flows that remain vital for Bangladesh's agriculture, ecology and livelihoods.

The same pattern is visible across infrastructure. Bangladesh today is the largest recipient of Indian concessional development financing, with nearly US$8 billion extended through Lines of Credit. These investments have not been symbolic diplomatic gestures. They have financed railway modernisation, roads, bridges, inland waterways, integrated check posts, port connectivity and cross-border logistics that facilitate trade while reducing transportation costs. Projects such as the Akhaura-Agartala Rail Link and the Khulna-Mongla Port Rail Line strengthen not only bilateral commerce but Bangladesh's aspiration to emerge as a regional connectivity hub linking South and Southeast Asia.

Security cooperation has followed a similarly pragmatic trajectory. Defence cooperation expanded significantly following the agreements signed in 2017, encompassing military training, intelligence sharing, counterterrorism cooperation and joint exercises such as Exercise SAMPRITI. These initiatives are not directed against any third country; rather, they strengthen Bangladesh's own ability to confront cross-border militancy, terrorism financing, illegal arms trafficking and organised criminal networks. In a region where security threats increasingly transcend borders, cooperation has become less a matter of political preference than of operational necessity.

The 2015 implementation of the Land Boundary Agreement demonstrated what mature diplomacy can achieve. For decades, the enclaves along the India-Bangladesh border represented one of the world's most complicated territorial anomalies, creating administrative uncertainty and opportunities for criminal exploitation. Their peaceful resolution transformed a chronic security challenge into an enduring example of political statesmanship, improving governance, border management and the everyday lives of thousands of people on both sides.

Beyond strategy and economics lies an equally important human dimension. Every year, hundreds of thousands of Bangladeshis travel to India seeking specialised medical care in fields ranging from oncology and cardiology to neurology and organ transplantation. Before the pandemic, India issued nearly 1.5 million visas annually to Bangladeshi citizens, making Bangladesh one of the largest recipients of Indian visas worldwide. During the Covid-19 crisis, India supplied more than two million doses of Covishield vaccines, helping launch Bangladesh's national vaccination programme. Even during the Ukraine conflict, India evacuated Bangladeshi citizens under Operation Ganga alongside its own nationals.

Such episodes illustrate that the relationship extends beyond diplomacy into humanitarian responsibility.

This extensive cooperation makes the growing anti-India discourse in sections of Bangladesh's political landscape particularly striking. Legitimate disagreements between neighbouring countries are neither unusual nor unexpected. Border management, migration, water sharing and trade disputes will continue to arise. However, these issues increasingly risk being absorbed into broader ideological campaigns that portray India not as a partner but as a strategic adversary. Such narratives may resonate within domestic politics, yet they often fail to acknowledge the structural realities that underpin Bangladesh's own development.

The growing anti-India narrative cannot be viewed in isolation from the wider geopolitical environment. Any weakening of India-Bangladesh relations inevitably creates space for external actors whose strategic interests do not always align with regional stability.

Pakistan has historically sought to exploit anti-India sentiment and ideological networks across South Asia as part of its broader strategic calculus, while China increasingly views Bangladesh through the prism of regional influence, economic leverage and strategic competition in the Bay of Bengal. Their methods differ, but both stand to gain from any weakening of the India-Bangladesh partnership.

Yet the larger reality remains unchanged. Neither ideological mobilisation nor external influence can alter the fundamentals of geography.

No external power can replicate India's geographical proximity, shared river systems, integrated energy networks, expanding connectivity corridors or immediate stake in Bangladesh's peace, stability and prosperity. These are advantages created not by diplomacy alone, but by geography itself.

In the end, geography does not negotiate. It continues to shape the choices that politics can only temporarily contest.

(The writer is an author and columnist. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi: For more than four decades, the Islamic Republic of Iran has presented itself as the loudest defender of the Palestinian cause. Every year, Tehran marks "Quds Day" with speeches condemning Israel, senior Iranian officials routinely describe Palestine as the "central issue" of the Muslim world, and support for Palestinian armed groups has been a pillar of Iran's revolutionary identity.

Yet recent events have exposed a striking contradiction between rhetoric and strategic behavior. The months following the Israel-Hamas war have demonstrated that while Iran is willing to support proxies, issue fiery statements, and celebrate the language of "resistance," it has shown remarkable restraint whenever its own national interests have been directly at stake. The contrast has become even more visible amid attempts to reduce tensions involving the United States and Israel.

This is not to suggest that Iran has abandoned every connection with Palestinian groups. Tehran continues to provide political backing and has long been associated with military and financial support for organisations such as Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. However, there is a widening gap between symbolic leadership of the Palestinian cause and a willingness to bear the costs of defending it militarily.

That distinction matters. A useful way to understand Iran's strategy is through an old Middle Eastern proverb: 'Raise your voice, but keep your sword sheathed until your own house is threatened'. Whether or not Iranian leaders would describe their policy this way, recent events closely resemble this logic.

Whenever negotiations or de-escalation efforts involving Iran emerge, the conversation often expands to include Lebanon and Hezbollah because Hezbollah represents Tehran's most powerful regional deterrent. Israeli calculations regarding Lebanon are deeply connected to Iran's influence over Hezbollah.

Yet one question remains conspicuously absent. Why has Gaza rarely become a central bargaining point?

If Iran truly considers Palestine its foremost regional priority, one would expect Tehran to insist that any broader regional understanding include meaningful pressure to reduce Israeli military operations in Gaza, humanitarian guarantees, or political concessions for Palestinians. Instead, Gaza has frequently remained separate from discussions concerning Iran's own strategic interests.

That separation reveals priorities. Countries negotiate hardest over issues they genuinely regard as vital to their national security. Iran has consistently negotiated over sanctions, nuclear issues, regional influence, and deterrence. Palestine, despite occupying a central place in official speeches, has rarely appeared as an indispensable condition for Iran's own diplomatic engagement.

Perhaps no episode illustrates this contradiction more vividly than the killing of Hamas political chief Ismail Haniyeh in Tehran in 2024. If one of Iran's closest Palestinian partners could be assassinated inside the Iranian capital, it represented not merely an intelligence failure but a symbolic blow to Iran's image as the protector of the 'Axis of Resistance'.

Iran vowed retaliation. The rhetoric was unmistakable. The eventual response, however, remained calibrated and carefully managed to avoid an uncontrollable regional war. While Tehran sought to preserve deterrence, it simultaneously demonstrated an equally strong desire to prevent direct military escalation with Israel and the United States. For Palestinians watching from Gaza, the contrast was difficult to ignore. The capital of the self-declared guardian of Palestine had been penetrated, yet the broader strategic calculus remained centered on Iran's own security rather than Palestinian objectives.

Iran's regional strategy has never relied solely on Palestinians. Its strongest and most sophisticated partner has always been Hezbollah in Lebanon. Unlike Hamas, Hezbollah provides Iran with strategic depth directly on Israel's northern border. It possesses far greater military capabilities and serves as a key element of Iran's deterrence architecture. That explains why developments involving Hezbollah often receive greater strategic attention in Tehran than those unfolding in Gaza.

The distinction is revealing. For Iran, Hezbollah is an asset tied directly to national security. Palestinian groups, by contrast, have often functioned as components of broader regional influence rather than ends in themselves.

History repeatedly demonstrates that states ultimately prioritise survival over ideology. The Soviet Union supported revolutionary movements across continents but abandoned many allies once geopolitical priorities shifted. The United States has similarly altered alliances when strategic interests demanded it. Iran is no exception. Despite revolutionary slogans, Iranian policymakers operate according to familiar principles of statecraft. They calculate costs, assess risks, and avoid actions that could threaten regime survival.

That explains why Iran has generally avoided entering a full-scale conventional war with Israel over Gaza despite the enormous civilian suffering and repeated declarations supporting Palestine. The leadership appears to have concluded that preserving the Islamic Republic outweighs military intervention on behalf of Palestinians. From a realist perspective, that calculation is unsurprising. From the standpoint of Iran's revolutionary narrative, however, it exposes an uncomfortable inconsistency.

Iran also faces a credibility challenge. Many across the Middle East increasingly distinguish between supporting the 'Palestinian cause' and supporting Iran's regional ambitions. Arab public opinion remains deeply sympathetic toward Palestinians while simultaneously questioning whether Tehran's policies primarily serve Palestinian interests or Iranian geopolitical influence. This distinction has become sharper during recent conflicts. Critics argue that Palestinian suffering has often been invoked rhetorically while remaining secondary whenever Iranian national priorities collide with Palestinian needs.

None of this means Iran has become indifferent to Palestine. Its ideological commitment remains genuine in important respects, and its long-standing relationships with Palestinian factions are well documented. However, commitment exists on a spectrum. The evidence suggests Iran is prepared to support Palestinians up to the point where doing so does not fundamentally endanger its own strategic interests. Beyond that threshold, caution replaces confrontation. This is not unique to Iran.

It is, in many respects, how states behave. The disappointment stems from the gap between expectations created by decades of revolutionary rhetoric and the more restrained conduct visible during moments of greatest crisis. Iran continues to portray itself as the standard-bearer of the Palestinian struggle. Yet its actions suggest that Palestine remains an important cause but not necessarily the defining priority of Iranian state policy.

For observers across the Middle East, the lesson is sobering. Governments may speak the language of solidarity, resistance, and shared destiny. But when strategic survival collides with ideological commitment, states almost always choose survival. Palestine, once again, has found itself caught between powerful narratives and even more powerful national interests.

(Dr Shujaat Ali Quadri is the National Convener of Muslim Youth Organisation of India. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 7: China, on July 1, 2026, did not merely bring a new statute into force - it gave legal language to a long-running project of cultural control. The Law on Promoting Ethnic Unity and Progress is presented by Beijing as a framework for harmony among China’s 56 officially recognised ethnic groups. But for Tibetans, Uyghurs, Mongols, Hui, Kazakhs and others, its real danger lies in how it turns identity into a matter of state discipline.

Across the world, Tibetan organisations and supporters marked the law’s implementation with coordinated protests, including in Dharamshala, warning that the law gives formal legal backing to policies that have already weakened minority languages, religions, family life, education, and diaspora activism.

The heart of the law is Article 6, which declares that a “sense of the community of the Chinese people” is the root of ethnic unity and bans acts that “undermine ethnic unity” or “create ethnic division.” The danger is not only in what the article says, but in what it does not define. In China’s political vocabulary, “ethnic division” has often been stretched to cover peaceful speech, cultural advocacy, religious expression and criticism of state policy. Amnesty International has warned that these broad terms risk arbitrary enforcement and could further criminalize activities such as promoting minority languages, documenting abuses, or campaigning for detainees.

Article 10 widens the threat by saying ethnic unity work must not be interfered with by “foreign forces” and that acts using “ethnicity, religion, or human rights” to undermine China must be opposed. This is deeply concerning because it frames human rights scrutiny itself as hostile interference. The article does not distinguish between a government-sponsored destabilisation campaign and a Tibetan exile asking for language rights, a Uyghur family searching for a missing relative or an international journalist investigating forced assimilation. This language fits a familiar Chinese state pattern - when minorities speak of rights, Beijing often recasts their claims as separatism or foreign manipulation.

The language provisions are among the most alarming. Article 15 makes the “national common language and script” the basic language of teaching and official work, promotes Mandarin learning from preschool, and requires Mandarin to be given prominence when used alongside minority languages. Article 16 then pushes the “community of the Chinese people” through the entire education process, including classrooms, textbooks, social practice and online education. On paper, the law says minority languages are respected; in practice, it places Mandarin and state ideology above mother-tongue education.

The case study already exists in Inner Mongolia. In 2020, authorities moved to replace Mongolian with Mandarin as the language of instruction for key subjects including language and literature, morality and law and history. Human Rights Watch documented protests, school boycotts, censorship, detentions, and the shutdown of Bainu, the only Mongolian-language social media platform in China. The lesson is clear: once the state defines Mandarin-first education as “unity,” defending mother-tongue learning can be treated as resistance.

Tibet shows the same pattern. Human Rights Watch found that Chinese-medium teaching was expanding in Tibetan primary schools and that Tibetan-medium schooling was being steadily squeezed through teacher transfers, textbook controls, school consolidation and pressure on informal Tibetan-language education. The case of Tashi Wangchuk remains a warning: after publicly advocating for Tibetan language rights, he was sentenced to five years in prison for “incitement to split the country.” Under the new law, the same kind of peaceful language advocacy can be framed even more easily as undermining “ethnic unity.”

Article 20 takes the law inside the home. It says governments should integrate the requirements of forging a Chinese national community into families and family education, and it requires parents or guardians to guide minors to love the Communist Party, the motherland, the people, and the Chinese nation. It also says guardians must not instil ideas “not conducive” to ethnic unity. This turns family memory into a political battlefield. A Tibetan parent teaching a child about exile, a Uyghur parent teaching religious heritage, or a Mongol parent defending native language could be placed under suspicion if that teaching conflicts with the state’s version of unity.

This is not theoretical. United Nations experts warned in 2023 that around one million Tibetan children were affected by Chinese government boarding-school policies aimed at cultural assimilation. These schools separate children from their families and place them in Mandarin-heavy, state-run environments where Tibetan language, religion, and local identity are pushed to the margins. When Article 20 is read with Articles 15 and 16, the law appears to legitimise exactly this kind of state intrusion into childhood.

Articles 22 to 27 promote “interaction, exchange, and integration” through housing, population management, student movement, employment, teacher exchanges, and youth activities. The language sounds soft, but it is built around state-directed social engineering. In minority regions, “integration” often means weakening the social spaces where minority life survives: villages, monasteries, local schools, community networks, and language environments. Article 14 also instructs authorities to highlight shared Chinese cultural symbols in public facilities, architecture, exhibitions, place names, and public activities. In Xinjiang, rights groups documented the renaming of roughly 630 Uyghur villages and towns to remove religious, cultural, or historical references and replace them with names reflecting Communist Party ideology or slogans such as unity and harmony. The religious provisions are equally serious.

Article 46 orders religious groups, religious schools, and religious activity sites to carry out education on the Chinese national community, follow the “Sinicization” of religion, adapt religion to socialist society, and guide believers toward patriotism. Article 62 then links “religious extremism” with criminal responsibility. In a country where “extremism” has already been used against ordinary Islamic practice, Tibetan Buddhist devotion, and independent religious education, these provisions give the state more room to police belief.

Xinjiang is the most severe case study. Human Rights Watch reported that revised Xinjiang religious regulations effective February 2024 tightened controls over Uyghur religious practice, required religions to follow socialist values and Sinicization, and gave grassroots cadres power to monitor “illegal” religious activity. The same report notes that since 2017, Uyghurs and other Turkic Muslims have faced mass detention, torture, disappearances, mass surveillance, family separation, forced labour, and religious persecution; a 2022 United Nations assessment found that abuses in Xinjiang may constitute crimes against humanity.

Article 31 brings the digital state into the project. It encourages the use of the internet, big data, and artificial intelligence to promote ethnic unity and requires network operators to stop, delete, preserve records of, and report content that undermines ethnic unity. Article 61 adds penalties for network operators that fail to perform these management duties. This creates a legal bridge between ideology and censorship: a post, image, video, sermon, song, or classroom material can be removed and reported if it conflicts with Beijing’s definition of unity.

Xinjiang again shows the danger. Human Rights Watch reverse-engineered the Integrated Joint Operations Platform, a police big-data system used to flag Turkic Muslims for investigation and possible detention on the basis of broad, non-criminal behaviour. HRW described a system in which surveillance technology, political policing, and mass detention reinforce one another. Under the new ethnic unity law, the state’s use of AI and big data is not treated as a rights risk; it is written into the legal architecture of ethnic governance.

Article 54 encourages citizens to report conduct that undermines ethnic unity and allows procuratorates to bring public interest litigation when such conduct harms national or public interests. Articles 57 to 60 add enforcement duties and penalties for organisations, institutions, enterprises, and staff who fail to stop such behaviour. This makes society itself part of the policing system. Schools, companies, neighbourhood committees, religious sites, media platforms, and even families are pushed to monitor speech and identity.

Finally, Article 63 is the clearest warning to the outside world. It says organisations and individuals outside mainland China who commit acts aimed at China that undermine ethnic unity or create ethnic division can be pursued for legal responsibility. Beijing has defended this provision as lawful and necessary, but the European Union has expressed concern that the law may restrict cultural, linguistic, and religious rights and enable transnational repression. Reuters reported that Taiwan also called it intimidation through “malicious transnational repression.”

The case studies are already there. Amnesty International has documented Uyghurs abroad facing intimidation, surveillance, pressure through family members in China, and information gathering by Chinese embassies and consulates. Freedom House describes China as running the world’s most sophisticated and comprehensive campaign of transnational repression, targeting Uyghurs, Tibetans, Hong Kongers, Inner Mongolians, religious communities, journalists, activists, and political dissidents across continents. Article 63 risks giving this campaign a new legal costume.

This law should therefore not be read as an isolated statute. It is a national codification of policies already tested in Tibet, Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, Hong Kong, and the diaspora: Mandarin-first schooling, ideological textbooks, religious Sinicization, digital surveillance, village renaming, family pressure, citizen reporting, and overseas intimidation. Its danger lies in its smooth vocabulary. “Unity” sounds peaceful. “Progress” sounds modern. But when unity means obedience, and progress means the disappearance of living cultures into a single state-approved identity, the law becomes an instrument of erasure.

As World Tibet Day and the Dalai Lama’s birthday on July 6 approach, the world should remember that Tibet’s struggle is not only about territory. It is about language spoken at home, prayers whispered in monasteries, children learning their own names, and exiles speaking without fear. A law that makes those things suspicious does not create harmony. It creates silence — and calls that silence: unity.

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, July 5 (SocialNews.XYZ) Thirty-six years is a long time -- long enough for hopes of justice to fade and tears of grief to dry. And when every door of justice and political will seemed firmly shut, one case has given an entire community reason to believe that justice, however delayed, may still be possible.

For the beleaguered Kashmiri Hindus, the chargesheet filed in the kidnapping and murder case of Sarla Bhat has rekindled long-lost hopes of justice and redemption. For more than three decades, the community has knocked on the doors of governments, the judiciary and even those who champion human rights. Nothing moved until the last week of June 2026, when investigators finally filed a chargesheet in the case.

Sarla Bhat's is only one among hundreds of cases in which families long ago stopped expecting justice. Officially, there is no comprehensive record of the violence inflicted upon the Kashmiri Pandit community after terrorism erupted in the Valley in 1989. Many cases were never properly documented.

The local administration and the political establishment of the time, functioning under the shadow of terrorism and the pro-Pakistan separatist ecosystem, either failed to register cases or did not pursue them seriously. Even many human rights groups and sections of civil society remained silent as persecuted Hindus were left with little choice but to flee the Valley in the early 1990s.

According to community estimates, more than seven lakh Kashmiri Hindus were forced to leave their homes and become refugees in their own country.

A report compiled by the Jammu and Kashmir Police in 2008, based on its own records, stated that militants had killed 209 Kashmiri Pandits from 1989 onwards, including 109 in 1990 alone. Kashmiri Pandit organisations, however, maintain that the actual number could be closer to 700. In the absence of complete official records, the figures remain disputed. Many victim families chose to flee to protect their women and children rather than approach a police force they believed had become compromised during those years.

The uncertainty is not confined to the number of murders. There are no definitive records of kidnappings, rapes, gang rapes, arson, loot, extortion, illegal occupation of properties, land encroachments and desecration of temples. The violence unleashed on Kashmiri Pandits was brutal. Equally disturbing has been the manner in which, during the pre-Article 370 abrogation years, influential sections of the political and intellectual ecosystem appeared more inclined to look away than confront what had happened.

On February 2, 1990, young businessman Satish Tickoo was shot in the legs outside his residence in the Karfalli locality of Habba Kadal in Srinagar. JKLF terrorist Bitta Karate allegedly led the group that attacked the unarmed Tickoo. He was beaten, kicked and left bleeding as slogans were raised around him. He bled to death. The members of the local Muslim neighbourhood, according to accounts of the incident, did not come to his rescue.

It is pertinent to recall that in a media interview, Bitta Karate had claimed to have killed at least 20 Kashmiri Pandits, perhaps even "30-40", in 1990 on the instructions of his handlers. He later retracted the statement, claiming the interview had been recorded under duress. Nothing moved after his much-televised 'confession'.

Equally striking is the fact that Karate was granted bail after spending 16 years in jail. The court reportedly observed that the prosecution had shown little interest in pursuing the case, reflecting the lack of seriousness with which such cases were handled for years. Such was the ecosystem which has been consistently trying to whitewash the violence perpetrated on the Hindu minority in the Valley.

The cases of brutality are many, but at least a few have finally begun to move.

The first case from the 1989-90 killings to be reopened by the Government of India was that of Justice Neelkanth Ganjoo, who was assassinated in 1989 by JKLF terrorists led by Yasin Malik. Justice Ganjoo had earlier sentenced JKLF terrorist Maqbool Bhat, who was hanged for the 1966 murder of a police officer.

There are many other cases which await justice -- telecommunications engineer B.K. Ganjoo (pumped with bullets as he tried to hide in a drum); Girja Tickoo (her autopsy revealed that she was brutally gang-raped and tortured, and was alive when she was cut into two pieces with a carpenter's saw, right through the middle of her body); Radio Kashmir Director Lassa Kaul, political leader Tika Lal Taploo, poet Sarwanand Premi and his son, among many others. The bodies of the Premi father-son duo were discovered hanging, bearing horrific signs of torture, including cigarette burns, broken limbs, and gouged eyes.

The stories of brutality are endless. For over three decades, Kashmiri Pandit organisations have consistently demanded a dedicated judicial commission to comprehensively investigate the targeted killings and the mass exodus of the community from the Kashmir Valley. No government has accepted that demand.

The Supreme Court, too, repeatedly declined requests for a fresh probe. In July 2017, it dismissed a public interest litigation seeking an investigation into the killings of Kashmiri Pandits and the prosecution of accused separatists, observing that it would be extremely difficult to collect evidence and conduct a meaningful investigation more than 27 years after the events.

Those repeated disappointments -- in courts as well as governments, both in the erstwhile state and at the Centre -- steadily eroded whatever hope the community still held.

That is why the chargesheet in the Sarla Bhat case carries significance beyond a single prosecution. It has reopened a window that many believed had been permanently sealed. Whether it ultimately leads to convictions remains to be seen, but for thousands of families who have waited for decades, it signals that the search for justice has not ended.

Thirty-six years is enough for memories to fade. But for those who lost parents, children, siblings, homes, temples and an entire way of life, those memories remain painfully alive.

The pain has travelled from one generation to the next. Having lived for decades as refugees in their own country, often with few voices willing to speak for them, Kashmiri Hindus see the Sarla Bhat case as more than just another criminal prosecution.

It offers a small but significant glimmer of hope that justice, however delayed, may finally begin to find its way. And perhaps, one day, it may also bring them closer to returning to Kashmir -- their native land, believed to have emerged from the ancient Satisar Lake through the efforts of Sage Kashyapa.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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Washington: There is an ongoing controversy in Pakistani media about the role of the Pakistan-occupied Jammu-Kashmir (PoJK) diaspora in crimes in Europe. The so-called experts further denigrate PoJK residents by implying that their criminal behaviour is linked to ethnicity, language, and societal beliefs. Till date, Pakistani media has ignored or disguised Kashmiris' involvement in these crimes. So, what prompted their sudden adjustment in attitude against PoJK inhabitants?

Pakistan regards the people of the PoJK, including Gilgit Baltistan, as colonial subjects, denying them basic rights and freedoms. To maintain absolute hegemony, the rulers keep residents on handouts with limited development funds and legislative authority. This contrasts with the vast abundance of natural resources that PoJK provides to Pakistan, such as forests, precious stones, heavy metals, gold, copper, and uranium. Pakistan has built multiple dams to suit its energy needs, with PoJK providing the majority of the water Pakistan uses.

PoJK provides Pakistan with the only, free transit route to its most vital strategic partner, China. For decades, locals have let Pakistan use them as cheap strategic fodder against India and Afghanistan, as needed by the Pakistani military. Throughout this time, Pakistani military Generals have made billions of dollars by using the territory and people of PoJK against India.

However, as the economic and political situation in Indian Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh improves tremendously, PoJK citizens are growing increasingly frustrated.

PoJK residents believe that India has done significantly more for Jammu and Kashmir than the Muslim Pakistan for the occupied region under its control. This has spurred protests and calls for improved care in Pakistan. Locals are seeking constitutional and citizenship rights, as well as internal autonomy.

However, due to mismanagement and corruption, Pakistan has little room to address the needs of disgruntled people. After 78 years, Pakistan's national GDP remains lower than that of the Indian state of Uttar Pradesh. Pakistan's per capita income has fallen since 2025, and its education and health budgets have been cut due to a shortage of funding.

The population of India's Ladakh has uninterrupted electricity, whereas in Pakistan-occupied Gilgit Baltistan, there is an average 20-hour outage each day. The Pakistani government has placed one of Asia's highest fuel taxes on inhabitants to meet their expenses. This has triggered widespread discontent against the government and military.

To deflect matters, the Pakistani army is implementing the same crowd management policies in PoJK that were used in East Pakistan (Bangladesh) and Balochistan.

On the one hand, army relentlessly targets local demonstrators, killing dozens and kidnapping hundreds. On the other, it utilises the loyal media to incite its citizenry against the people of PoJK to legitimise bare brutality and unlawful hegemony.

When East Pakistanis came on streets for basic rights, Pakistani media began portraying them as savages, disparaging their ethnicity, physical appearance, culinary customs, and other aspects of their heritage. They aimed to show that Bengalis are ungrateful, uncivilised, and inferior barbarians who require military force and iron-fisted authority. They tried to prove that conversations and other peaceful forms of communication would be useless because locals were doing India's dirty work.

Today, the media tries to persuade Pakistani citizens that military action in PoJK is the fault of the locals and that there is no other way to control criminals, terrorists, and traitors.

However, people in PoJK have learned from East Pakistan, Pashtunistan, Afghanistan, and Balochistan about how Islamabad employs racism to deny rights and prolong occupation. Therefore, PoJK locals reject the rulers and their tactics and demand immediate withdrawal because Pakistani occupiers are incapable of providing dignified care for them.

(Senge Sering is the founder of Washington-based Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, June 28: Located roughly 1,000 miles from the Indian mainland, Great Nicobar is one of the 500-plus islands that make up the Andaman and Nicobar archipelago. The island is historically tied to two distinct indigenous groups: the Shompen and the Great Nicobarese.

The Shompen are an isolated community of roughly 200 to 400 individuals who avoid the outside world and maintain a traditional lifestyle as some of the world’s last remaining hunter-gatherers and farmers. The Great Nicobarese originally inhabited the island’s western coastline until the catastrophic 2004 tsunami either claimed their lives or forced them to relocate.

Multi-Layered Security in the Indo-Pacific

In this era of intensifying strategic competition with China, Great Nicobar is not just a remote island but will soon be a critical geopolitical asset for India upon completion of the project. Situated 40 nautical miles from the Strait of Malacca – the conduit for over 80% of China’s oil imports – this strategic vantage point empowers India to monitor, influence and secure this invaluable maritime chokepoint by enabling continuous surveillance over the eastern Indian Ocean’s sea lanes of communication (SLOCs), rapid asset deployment, logistical depth for sustained operations and strengthened regional deterrence. Any action concerning the Strait of Malacca will always be a last resort due to its importance to global trade and commerce. The capability and intent to disrupt this SLOC serves as a powerful deterrent to ensure strategic equilibrium.

With the world realising the value of multi-layered defences following the October 7th attack, war in the Middle East and Indian defences during Operation Sindoor, New Delhi is adopting a tiered strategy when it comes to its Indo-Pacific strategy. It is deepening geopolitical and military ties to strengthen regional partners the Philippines and Indonesia to develop a network of trust, partnerships and shared maritime interests. A strong case in point is the Brahmos export to Manila, highlighting the growing defence cooperation and interoperability. Jakarta and Hanoi have signed a deal for the missile system too. Multilateral naval cooperation like Exercise Malabar enhance coordination, readiness and interoperability with like-minded partners to promote a free, open, inclusive, secure and rules-based Indo-Pacific. India continues to expand its maritime surveillance through a ‘space-to-seabed’ approach – developing and utilising surface, sub-surface, seabed, air, space and cyber-space assets in a single, integrated system. Modernisation of the Navy and Air Force ensure credible force projection across the Indian Ocean Region (IOR).

Approaches into the IOR

The Indian Navy has stated that its anti-submarine efforts are due to the growing Chinese sub-surface threat in the IOR, impacting Indian influence in its sphere of influence. In January 2016, the Indian Navy deployed its premier intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) asset – two Boeing P8Is – to the Andaman and Nicobar Islands to obtain intelligence on People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarines in the region. the following year, 17 PLAN ships were spotted in the IOR, supported by submarines for ‘anti-piracy’ operations. 2024 was another year in which the IOR witnessed significant and frequent PLAN and supporting-vessel deployments.

Economically-viable commerce from Africa, Europe and beyond cannot flow through either the Lombok or Sunda Strait. The Sunda Strait is quite shallow, with an average depth of 50 metres while the Lombok Strait is deeper, making it easier to allow submarines through. Both straits have had submarine transits, with India’s first submarine to use the Sunda Strait being the INS Sindhukesari (S60) in February 2023.

The Malacca Strait is the fastest and most cost-effective transit route for goods from Africa and Europe going to East Asia. It is not a chokepoint unlike the Suez and Panama Canals or the Strait of Hormuz because a major blockage in the Malacca Strait will not cause as much of an impact as in the others. With the IOR having evolved from an ‘era of cooperation’ to an ‘era of [strategic] competition’, India is employing both sea control and sea denial in its naval strategy.

Sea Control and Sea Denial

In 2015, the Indian Navy articulated its strategy for conflict to include both sea control and sea denial. Strategies of sea control is when there is “… freedom of action to use an area for one’s own purposes for a period of time and, if required, to deny its use to an opponent”. On the other hand, sea denial aims to prevent another force from using the sea. While its focus is on defense, the strategy can utilise offensive measures if required.

Indian intent for sea control can be seen in its 15-year roadmap to develop a third indigenous aircraft carrier, albeit nuclear-powered; order for 114 Dassault Rafales, additional P8Is, MQ-9B SeaGuardian UAVs, Airbus C-295-based Multi-Mission Maritime Aircraft (MMMA), Dornier DO-228s, Air-Ship Based High Altitude Pseudo Satellite (AS-HAPS), among other platforms. These measures can also be well-utilised for sea denial by establishing an anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) grid, supported by geography, sensors and long-range targeting solutions like the Brahmos missile system.

To this end, Air Force Station (AFS) Carnicobar witnessed Chief of Defence Staff General Anil Chauhan inaugurate the upgraded runway at the AFS in January 2026, now capable of deploying Sukhoi Su-30 MKIs, Mirage-2000s, SEPECAT-Jaguars, Lockheed Martin C-130J Super Hercules, Mil Mi-17 V5s and Boeing P8Is. The runways of existing airports in the islands will be expanded to 3,000 kilometres, two new airports will be constructed in Sri Vijayapuram and on Great Nicobar, and all airports will be dual-use, as stated by Lieutenant Governor Admiral DK Joshi. The Indian Government has dropped its plans to extend the runway of INS Baaz due to aviation safety, environmental and societal reasons. Instead, it will build a greenfield dual-use airport with a 3,300-kilometre runway on Great Nicobar Island near Galathea Bay, operated by the Indian Air Force.

The Strategic Synergy of Aircraft Carriers and Forward Bases

India’s naval doctrine envisions the need for three aircraft carriers – two operational and one in reserve – to effectively manage a simultaneous two-front contingency involving China and Pakistan across the northern sector and maritime domain. However, due to current capacity constraints, India operates only two. To compensate and project power effectively, these mobile Carrier Strike Groups (CSGs) rely heavily on India’s natural geography as force-multipliers.

While aircraft carriers are flexible, mobile assets essential for sea control and strategic signalling far from shore, forward bases provide the fixed, sustaining support needed for long-term endurance. The Andaman and Nicobar Islands perfectly fulfil this role, extending India’s operational reach and enhancing the effectiveness of its Armed Forces.

India’s ‘Unsinkable Aircraft Carrier’

The development of Great Nicobar Island is not an act of aggression but a strategic necessity to secure India’s maritime future in the face of China’s expanding regional footprint. The island functions as a highly resilient, cost-effective ‘unsinkable aircraft carrier.’ Unlike expensive and vulnerable man-made ships, this permanent land-based infrastructure cannot be easily neutralised or sunk, thereby raising India’s self-reliance and reducing its dependence on external military assets.

By leveraging this geographic advantage, India achieves several distinct operational and geopolitical objectives:

1. Unmatched Surveillance and Sea Control: Positioned perfectly in the Eastern Indian Ocean, the island allows India to closely monitor adversarial movements across critical Sea Lines of Communication (SLOCs) and physically dominate vital Indo-Pacific chokepoints.

2. Logistical Depth and Rapid Response: The island serves as a permanent launchpad for the rapid deployment of aerial and maritime assets. It provides the necessary logistical depth to sustain long-duration operations without requiring resupply from the mainland.

3. Credible Deterrence and Regional Stability: Acting as a stabilising military platform, the island anchors the balance of power in the region. It ensures continuous deterrence against adversaries, safeguards India’s maritime interests and enables deeper cooperation with like-minded nations to guarantee a free, open and secure Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

The Great Nicobar Project represents a cornerstone of India’s evolving, multi-layered Indo-Pacific defense strategy. By developing Great Nicobar Island in this manner, New Delhi is accounting for its security, developmental, economic, societal and environmental needs. It allows for unmatched logistical depth, rapid asset deployment capabilities and continuous ‘space-to-seabed’ surveillance over vital SLOCs. Alongside deepening defence ties with regional partners like the Philippines and Indonesia, this strategic vantage point acts as a powerful deterrent to safeguard maritime equilibrium. Ultimately, Great Nicobar Island is an indispensable bridge to a safe, secure and sovereign India, seamlessly connecting the nation’s destiny to the broader oceans.

(The writer is a senior research associate at NatStrat)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, June 27 (SocialNews.XYZ) Seven opinion pieces in two years. Three focused on Gaza and Iran. Sonia Gandhi's repeated focus on West Asia has triggered a fresh political debate over her priorities and the intent behind her criticism of Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led government.

In her latest op-ed, the Congress leader accuses the Centre of maintaining "silence" on Gaza and claims India is drifting away from its traditional foreign policy.

However, government sources reject the charge, pointing to India's repeated calls for dialogue, humanitarian assistance for Palestinians, support for a two-state solution, and diplomatic engagement acknowledged even by Iran.

The contrast has prompted government sources and political observers to raise a broader question: Is Sonia Gandhi highlighting a genuine foreign policy concern, or is her repeated focus on Gaza and Iran aimed at sending a political message to a key domestic constituency?

Sonia Gandhi's charge that India has maintained "silence" and displayed an "abdication" of its moral and diplomatic responsibilities does not square with New Delhi's consistent diplomatic engagement in West Asia.

Officials point out that India has repeatedly reiterated its support for a two-state solution, humanitarian assistance for the Palestinian people, and a peaceful resolution to the Gaza conflict while simultaneously maintaining strong strategic ties with Israel.

Government sources further note that India's diplomatic outreach has been acknowledged internationally. They recall how during heightened tensions in the region earlier this year, Iranian President Masoud Pezeshkian thanked Prime Minister Narendra Modi during a conversation.

The Iranian leader had described India as a “trusted friend”. He also appreciated New Delhi's consistent advocacy for dialogue, diplomacy, and de-escalation.

Moreover, Iranian officials and the Iranian Embassy in India also publicly appreciated India's humanitarian assistance. They also lauded India’s “balanced diplomatic approach”.

With this in view, BJP leaders argue that Sonia Gandhi ignores India's actual diplomatic record. India has neither abandoned Palestine nor uncritically aligned itself with Israel, they contend.

What India has done is it has instead attempted to maintain a calibrated position that safeguards humanitarian concerns, regional stability, energy security, and India's national interests, say analysts.

Government sources also point to what they describe as a noticeable pattern in Sonia Gandhi's writings over the past two years. She has authored seven opinion pieces over the past two years, with three focusing on Gaza or Iran, they remark.

This, they argue, raises legitimate political questions about why these issues receive repeated attention while several humanitarian crises closer to India's immediate strategic concerns receive comparatively little attention.

Repeated criticism by Congress leader Sonia Gandhi over Gaza is intended to resonate with sections of Muslim voters ahead of future elections rather than contribute to a substantive debate on foreign policy, political analysts argue.

They wonder whether the Congress leadership is attempting to frame India's foreign policy through a domestic political lens.

Political observers ask whether Gandhi has been equally vocal on issues such as the persecution of Hindus in Bangladesh, the exodus of Afghan Sikhs following the Taliban's return to power, or the displacement of Kashmiri Hindus.

The “selective” emphasis reflects political priorities rather than a comprehensive human rights perspective, BJP leaders argue.

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, June 21 (SocialNews.XYZ) The yoga mats have been rolled up and the photographs uploaded; however, after watching the annual event, one cannot help but question whether politicians truly require formal yoga training, as many appear to have been engaging in more advanced asanas for years.

In fact, politics increasingly resembles one giant yoga camp where every party has developed its own signature posture.

The ruling establishment, for example, has mastered what may be called the Victory Asana.

This is an advanced pose that requires practitioners to maintain the confidence of a champion athlete regardless of circumstances. Electoral victories have helped build a strong national presence, and people are generally happy. The true test of the posture is maintaining the same confidence after practising for more than a decade, which this dispensation is doing so repeatedly, at the Centre and in states.

The latest being West Bengal, where the most difficult battle was won with what can only be described as Precision Yoga -- a combination of several difficult asanas performed in perfect sequence.

The ruling party is usually careful about how it approaches these asanas. But occasional glitches do appear, as seen in the Karnataka MLC polls, where some members cross-voted.

The Opposition, meanwhile, specialises in a very different discipline: the Eternal Protest Pose.

The rules are simple. If the government moves left, oppose it, and if it moves right, oppose it. If it remains still, again oppose by labelling it as an inability to move. The objective is consistency through disagreement, and a few practitioners have adopted this posture with greater dedication than Rahul Gandhi.

He has become the chief practitioner of what may be the most demanding posture in contemporary politics: the Eternal Discontent Asana.

For years, he has practised dissatisfaction regardless of the political weather. If the government announces progress, the progress is questioned. If it backtracks, the reversal is criticised, and even if it stands still, stagnation becomes the subject of criticism.

The discipline is sustained across election cycles with remarkable consistency. In this form of yoga, contentment is not the goal -- continuity of critique is. The practitioner must also convince the country that he is the natural alternative to Prime Minister Narendra Modi, reassure Congress workers that victory is achievable, and assure alliance partners that he can be the leader, and Gandhi has been doing all this.

If Rahul Gandhi is committed to Eternal Discontent Asana, others in the Opposition are attempting similar postures -- with one key difference: they want national hand-holding while maintaining regional supremacy. Maintaining that balance, under such conditions, deserves professional recognition.

Akhilesh Yadav has perfected what may be called the Coalition Contortion Asana; rather, it is a kind of Alliance Stretch. Ideological muscles are extended far beyond their natural limits without quite tearing. Yesterday’s rival becomes today’s ally, and today’s ally becomes tomorrow’s negotiation. Yoga teaches flexibility, and coalition politics has worked on it.

Arvind Kejriwal once practised what might be called the Rapid Motion Asana. For years, he seemed to be everywhere at once -- campaigning, governing, protesting, debating, accusing, and defending. More recently, after electoral losses, he appears to have entered a more demanding discipline: Strategic Meditation. The challenge now is to remain politically relevant while speaking less than before. Anyone who has tried meditation knows how difficult it can be.

Mamata Banerjee, meanwhile, has become the unexpected face of the Defiant Reality Asana. The posture is a careful balance between acceptance and resistance -- held even when the ground beneath begins to shift.

For years, she appeared politically indestructible. Election after election, challenge after challenge, she convinced supporters that Bengal politics revolved around her. Then came 2026, and her government fell. The party suffered its biggest setback, and even she lost her seat.

Politics, much like yoga, has a habit of testing those who become too comfortable in a position. The challenge before her now is not defeating opponents, but rebuilding confidence among supporters who had forgotten what defeat looked like.

Her INDIA bloc colleague Uddhav Thackeray has become the undisputed master of the Shrinking Circle Asana. This is a posture in which practitioners continue to claim ownership of a tradition even as organisations, representatives, symbols and even flags gradually move elsewhere.

His political journey in recent years resembles a long workshop on regaining balance after repeated falls. His government collapsed, and the Shiv Sena split. The party symbol became a subject of legal and political dispute. And now even his parliamentary colleagues have chosen different paths. He, however, seems to be trapped in the Illusion Yoga posture, insisting he represents the authentic legacy.

Collectively, however, the Opposition’s greatest contribution to political yoga remains the INDIA bloc Pranayama. The exercise begins with a deep inhalation of unity, and the participants then hold their breath through seat-sharing negotiations. A long exhalation follows when disagreements emerge. The cycle repeats before every major election.

The ruling side has developed its own breathing exercise: inhale electoral victories, exhale confidence -- often in generous quantities. Occasionally, so much confidence is released that discussions begin about elections still years away.

The most remarkable thing about Indian politics, perhaps, is that everyone believes they are practising different philosophies while performing remarkably similar movements.

But in all this, voters quietly go about their lives. Every election season, they remind everyone who the real yoga masters are. They alone have the ability to make powerful leaders lose their balance through the Voter Asana.

It is only the voter who knows how to pull the rug from under the mat and topple a leader.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, June 20 (SocialNews.XYZ) The real story of NEET re-examination is not the leak itself but the scale of the response it triggered. Once the integrity of 3 May examination was compromised, the challenge before the state was far larger than conducting another test.

It had to restore confidence among millions of students and parents, reassure the public that merit would prevail, and demonstrate that a national examination could still command trust. In just a few weeks, an extensive security and administrative apparatus was assembled to meet that challenge.

The measures put in place for the June 21 re-examination offer a revealing glimpse into the capacities of the state when confronted with a crisis that strikes at the heart of public faith in institutions.

The first step was a clear diagnosis. A leak is rarely a failure of intent. It is a failure of the chain, the long route a question paper travels from the printing press to the candidate's desk. Somewhere along that route the security broke. So, the fix had to secure every link, from the moment of printing to the moment the seal is opened in the hall. The arrangements made for June 21 follow that logic closely.

Consider the transport of the paper itself. The question papers are being moved with the help of the Indian Air Force, which compresses the ground transit window and shrinks the opportunity for interception. The Ministry of Home Affairs has drawn in the central armed police forces, with the CRPF and the CISF providing layered security around the movement of the papers. The printing hubs, the most sensitive nodes of all, are being handled with corresponding care. This is the part of the system that failed last time, and it is the part that has been hardened most.

At the centre, the focus shifts from the paper to the person. Biometric verification and facial recognition are being used to confirm that the candidate in the seat is the candidate on the roll. AI-enabled CCTV adds a layer of monitoring that does not tire or look away. Multiple rounds of frisking guard against devices that have, in past scandals, turned a fair test into a marketplace. None of this is glamorous. All of it is necessary, because the integrity of an examination lives or dies in these small procedural details.

Around the test sits the quieter arrangements that rarely make news. Railways are running special trains to carry candidates to their centres on time. Free bus services have been organised in several places. Where large gatherings near centres could create risk, local authorities have imposed prohibitory orders to keep the immediate environment calm. These measures treat the aspirant not as an afterthought but as the point of the entire exercise.

Holding all of this together is coordination at the top. The Cabinet Secretary has chaired a series of review meetings, first with the secretaries of central ministries, then with the chief secretaries of the states and then with the testing agency itself. The purpose of these meetings is not ceremony. It is to make a federal system pull in one direction, so that the centre, the states and the agency are working to a single plan. This is the unglamorous core of state capacity, the ability to align many hands behind one task under a tight deadline.

What does the sum of these efforts signify. At one level it is simply good administration under pressure. At another, it is a deliberate act of trust repair. The damage from a leak is not only practical. It is psychological. It tells students that the system cannot be relied upon. Visible, serious security is the state's answer to that doubt. Each layer is also a signal, meant to tell a wary candidate that this time the paper is safe and the test is real. The security is for the integrity of the exam, but it is also for the confidence of the examinee.

A fair assessment must note the cost. Heavy security carries its own burden, and some have warned that an elaborate apparatus can add to the pressure on already anxious students. The point is well taken. The true measure of success on June 21 will not be the number of forces deployed. It will be a calm and clean examination that ends without incident, where the safeguards are felt as reassurance rather than as menace. A fortress that frightens the people it protects has missed its purpose. The art lies in security that steadies nerves instead of fraying them.

Seen as a whole, the exercise is larger than a single test. The state is, in effect, building a template for how to secure high-stakes public examination at scale. The lessons of this leak, once the dust settles, can be written into standing procedure, so that the next examination does not have to be rescued in a crisis but is protected by design. That is the real prize. Not a single clean re-exam, but a system that learns to hold the chain of trust intact on its own.

The forces will stand down once the papers are collected and the halls are cleared. The capability assembled to protect this one examination should not. If the machinery built in haste this June becomes the routine of every exam hereafter, then a painful episode will have left something durable behind. The measure of a serious state is whether it turns its crises into capacity. On this examination, it has set out to do exactly that.

Source: IANS

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Washington: After months of stalled talks, Pakistan's occupying authority dismissed the Joint Awami Action Committee (JAAC) in Pakistan-occupied Kashmir (PoK) on June 5, declaring it as an Indian agent and terrorist. Many locals now believe that the discussions were a ruse to buy time, causing schisms among leaders and immobilising the movement.

JAAC calls for structural reforms to ensure genuine autonomy. It seeks the abolition of allowances, perks, and privileges for Pakistani officers stationed in Pakistan-occupied territory. It demands an independent accountability body to combat corruption. JAAC wants the authorities to eliminate excessive tariffs and taxes, especially as PoK is not part of Pakistan. JAAC intends to put an end to the theft of native lands and natural resources. Uncontrolled deforestation and the construction of mega dams are key causes of water scarcity and environmental issues.

Pakistan regards the people of PoK as nothing more than a useful tool against India, and intends to continue treating them as colonial subjects. Granting communities' requests for autonomy also decreases Pakistan's chances of stealing their land and resources.

The main demands include the abolition of 12 seats in the assembly, which are occupied by Pakistanis. These people claim to have descended from refugees from Kashmir Valley and Jammu. Many of them hold high-level positions in government and the judiciary. One such individual is the present chief justice of the regional "Supreme Court".

The present high-ranking police officers in Mirpur and Kotli claim to be descendants of Kashmiri refugees. Many of them also run the local branch of the All Parties Hurriyat Conference. The JAAC accuses these individuals of assisting Pakistani secret service officials in forming and dissolving governments in PoK. To raise awareness about these issues, the JAAC staged a successful shutter down and wheel jam strike in Muzaffarabad, the so called capital of PoK, on June 9.

Instead of heeding the fair demands, Pakistan dispatched 26,000 police and military forces to subdue the protesters. The media reports that the local puppet administration is helpless because the Pakistani military has taken matters into its own hands to carry out the hegemonic commands.

According to accounts, 14 people were killed as a result of attacks on demonstrators. Over 1000 individuals including women and children were injured and 300 still missing, including some critically injured who were taken from hospitals to unknown location for torture.

In numerous spots, the military is utilising snipers to shoot and murder protestors. To encourage the murder of JAAC leaders, the army has placed millions of rupee bounty on their heads. The army has banned the media and disabled phone and internet connections. Some people are using various other means to broadcast videos of shootings and violence to the outside world. The military is torturing and arresting journalists for recording the incidents. They are infiltrating mosques, pushing clergy to condemn JAAC and discourage their followers from joining the strike.

In hospitals, they intimidate physicians and staff while obstructing care for injured protesters. The army is holding dozens of corpses hostage and refuses to release them to their family. Despite this, millions of people are moving towards the capital, Muzaffarabad. The entire PoK appears to be backing JAAC, having respected the June 9 shutter down and wheel jam strike.

During the protests, Pakistani law enforcement officers forced their way into homes and shops, looting jewelry, money, and causing significant damage. Women were assaulted and raped in numerous cities and towns. As the saying goes, the apple doesn't fall far from the tree, and these heinous activities bring to mind the events of 1947, when Pakistanis entered the Kashmir valley to plunder homes and rape women.

The army is concerned that protests would disrupt the assembly election, which is scheduled for July 27. On June 7, Pakistan staged an assembly election in occupied Gilgit Baltistan, another region of the PoK, which the military rigged in favour of the ruling party. The people of PoK are considering boycotting Pakistani parties. Nationalists and separatists in PoK do not contest because they are required to submit an affidavit of loyalty to Pakistan.

Asim Munir, President Trump's "favourite General", is carrying out a bloodbath in PoK. Every time US and Chinese officials wrap their arms around Pakistani Generals, it opens up financial and strategic window to inflict agony and suffering on minorities in Balochistan, Pashtunistan, and PoK.

A country like Pakistan, which does not ensure peace for its own inhabitants, cannot be trusted to assist in creating peace between Iran and the United States. How could President Trump trust Asim Munir, who is despised by his own people, to bring love to the neighbourhood? Americans should understand that Pakistan's financial and geopolitical interests are prolonging the standoff rather than ending it.

Munir also intended to perpetrate acts of terrorism in India. However, he sees that opportunity disappearing owing to the upheaval in PoK. It's probable that he's using brute force against the Kashmiris as a punishment for preventing him from seizing this opportunity.

People in PoK are also disappointed with the Kashmiris on the Indian side, for failing to turn out in significant numbers to oppose Pakistani occupiers' brutal acts. They feel that they can support Palestine and Iran, but not their own compatriots under Pakistani tyranny.

Many people in PoK want India to bring a complaint against Pakistan in the International Court of Justice. They want the UN to call a special session to discuss the tragedy in PoK. The UN should urge Pakistan to keep its promise made in 1948 to withdraw completely from PoK, including Gilgit Baltistan.

(Senge Sering is the founder of Washington-based Institute for Gilgit Baltistan Studies. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, June 7 (SocialNews.XYZ) When historian Ramachandra Guha remarked that he did not believe Congress leader Rahul Gandhi was equipped to handle major national challenges such as an energy crisis or a war, he gave voice to a question that has lingered in Indian politics for years.

The significance of the observation lay less in the remark itself and more in who made it. Guha is hardly known for being sympathetic to Prime Minister Narendra Modi or the BJP. His criticism of the government has been consistent and often unsparing. Therefore, when someone from outside the BJP's political ecosystem raises doubts about the Opposition's leadership credentials, the comment inevitably carries greater weight.

The debate is about Rahul Gandhi and the larger condition of India's Opposition and its ability to present itself as a credible alternative government.

Over the past decade, the Modi government has faced a succession of challenges, from the Covid-19 pandemic and border tensions to economic disruptions and global geopolitical shocks. Supporters of the government argue that despite criticism and setbacks, it has managed to retain public confidence. Critics may disagree with many of its decisions, but there is little doubt that PM Modi continues to enjoy a level of political trust that no other contemporary leader can match.

That reality poses a difficult question for the Opposition. If large sections of the electorate continue to back the ruling leadership despite economic pressures and periodic crises, where exactly is the Opposition falling short?

Many voters may be dissatisfied with specific policies, rising prices, or local governance issues, but they do not necessarily see a convincing national alternative waiting in the wings. Elections are not decided merely by dissatisfaction with incumbents; they are also determined by confidence in those seeking to replace them.

This is where the Rahul-led Opposition appears to struggle. Too often, its politics seems driven by opposition for its own sake rather than by a clearly articulated vision of governance. Personal attacks on PM Modi frequently generate headlines, but headlines alone do not build public confidence. Voters eventually look beyond slogans and ask a simpler question: if not the present government, then who, and with what plan?

Recent political developments illustrate this challenge. Across different states, voters have displayed a remarkable willingness to make independent choices based on local realities rather than broad national narratives. State-specific factors, anti-incumbency sentiments, and regional dynamics often shape electoral outcomes. Despite these fluctuations, the Opposition has found it difficult to translate episodic discontent into a sustained national political movement.

The problem is not a shortage of issues. Inflation, unemployment, agrarian distress, and social tensions provide ample political ammunition. The challenge is converting criticism into credibility.

That is why many of the movements and campaigns that were projected as major turning points against the BJP have ultimately failed to produce the political consequences their supporters anticipated. The protests against the Citizenship Amendment Act, the agitation over farm laws, the wrestlers' protest and several social media-driven campaigns generated enormous attention and, in some cases, forced the government to respond. But they did not fundamentally alter the BJP's electoral dominance.

There is criticism of the government, but there is no corresponding confidence in the Opposition. The space for a strong national challenger exists, but no political force has been able to occupy it convincingly.

The emergence of groups seeking to fill this vacuum is therefore not surprising. Some gain visibility on social media; others capture public attention for a brief period, and a few even generate excitement among anti-establishment voters. Indian politics has repeatedly demonstrated that public attention and electoral success are not the same thing.

Even the Aam Aadmi Party, once seen as the most serious challenger to the traditional political order, has found the transition from movement politics to long-term national expansion far more difficult than expected. The lesson is simple: discontent alone cannot sustain a political alternative. Leadership, organisation, credibility, and a coherent vision matter just as much.

Seen in that context, Guha's remarks acquire significance. They revive an uncomfortable question for the Congress leadership: has it done enough to convince voters that it is prepared to govern during moments of national difficulty?

The issue is not whether Rahul Gandhi has the right to criticise the Prime Minister. In a democracy, criticism of those in power is both legitimate and necessary. The real issue is whether that criticism is accompanied by an alternative vision. Oppositions do not earn public trust merely by highlighting the government's failures; they earn it by demonstrating their own readiness to govern.

The irony is that the constitutional book that Rahul Gandhi frequently flashes places enormous importance on the role of the Opposition. Dr B.R. Ambedkar regarded a vigilant Opposition as essential for democratic accountability. Similarly, former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee believed that criticism was most effective when it was rooted in policy, principle, and national interest rather than personal hostility. But today, is the Rahul Gandhi-led Opposition doing so?

The real challenge before the Rahul Gandhi-led Opposition, therefore, is not finding a sharper slogan against PM Modi or a more effective political attack. It is building the kind of responsible, persuasive, and credible Opposition that can convince voters it is ready for power. Until that happens, observations such as Guha's will continue to resonate because many voters see them as reflecting a political reality.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 31 (SocialNews.XYZ) When Union Home Minister Amit Shah set out to review and secure India's international borders, it may have appeared to be a routine exercise. After all, border security falls squarely within the Home Ministry's responsibilities. But there is something different about this exercise.

In nearly eight decades of Independence, India has rarely witnessed a government pursue border security with such intensity and political focus. Previous governments spoke about strengthening national security. The Modi government is attempting something far more expansive. It wants to identify infiltration networks, check illegal encroachments, plug loopholes in the system and address what it sees as the long-term consequences of unchecked illegal migration across India's borders.

That is why this mission deserves attention.

As the Modi government enters its thirteenth year in office, it is taking decisions that affect not only external security but also internal stability. For decades, infiltration from across India's borders, particularly from Bangladesh and Pakistan, remained a subject of political debate but rarely received sustained administrative attention.

Today, the issue can no longer be ignored. The situation has reached a point where the government believes that illegal infiltrators are not only compromising national security but also placing pressure on public resources. They are taking away employment opportunities from local youth and, most worryingly, contributing to a demographic shift.

What makes the present debate unusual is the emphasis on demography. Never before has a government at the Centre spoken so openly about demographic change as a matter of national concern. For decades, such discussions remained confined to academic studies, census reports and occasional political speeches. Today, they are part of mainstream political discourse. It is perhaps for the first time in independent India's history that attempts to alter demographic balances are being discussed and treated as a matter of national concern.

Census data shows that Hindus constituted about 84 per cent of India's population in 1951, while Muslims accounted for 9.8 per cent. By 2011, the Hindu share had declined to around 79.8 per cent, while the Muslim share had risen to 14.2 per cent.

The debate over demography cannot be separated from the legacy of Partition. The creation of Pakistan was justified on the basis of religion, but millions of Muslims chose to remain in India and became equal citizens of the new Republic.

Over the decades, concerns have periodically surfaced over demographic changes in certain regions, particularly along India's eastern border. These changes cannot be viewed in isolation from illegal immigration from neighbouring countries. The Muslim population growth rate remains higher than that of Hindus and several other communities. This stands in sharp contrast to Pakistan and Bangladesh, where the share of religious minorities has steadily declined over the decades.

Different political groups draw different conclusions from these figures. But they have undoubtedly become a major reference point in discussions on demography and migration.

Addressing the Narendra Mohan Memorial Lecture in October 2025 on the theme of 'Infiltration, Demographic Change and Democracy', Amit Shah said that demographic shifts in several border regions were linked not only to fertility rates but also to decades of illegal infiltration from neighbouring countries.

West Bengal has emerged as the most prominent example in this debate. Recent reports and investigations relating to undocumented Bangladeshi migrants, forged identity documents and alleged infiltration networks have intensified political scrutiny.

BJP leaders have accused the Trinamool Congress of facilitating such networks for electoral gain. They argue that resistance to complete border fencing under the Mamata Banerjee government must be viewed in this context. According to this argument, gaps in enforcement created conditions in which infiltration networks could flourish and eventually become part of a larger vote-bank ecosystem.

Questions are now being asked that were rarely asked with such urgency before. How did illegal entrants obtain documentation? Who enabled them? How widespread are these networks? And why were corrective measures delayed for so long?

Similar concerns have been raised in Assam and other parts of the Northeast. Amit Shah has previously pointed to Census trends in Assam and argued that demographic changes in several districts cannot be understood without taking infiltration into account.

He has noted that the decadal growth rate of the Muslim population in Assam, according to the 2011 Census, stood at 29.6 per cent and argued that such growth could not be explained without considering illegal immigration. He has made similar observations about districts in West Bengal and about demographic changes affecting tribal populations in parts of Jharkhand.

These developments have revived long-standing concerns that were often dismissed or treated as secondary in public discourse. For decades, infiltration was treated primarily as a law-and-order issue. The Modi government is treating it as a demographic, political and national security issue as well.

That shift explains the Centre's decision to constitute a High-Level Committee to study demographic changes arising from illegal immigration and other abnormal factors. Prime Minister Narendra Modi's announcement of a Demography Mission in 2025 reflected the government's intention to place the issue at the heart of policymaking.

As the Modi government enters its thirteenth year in office with a historic win in West Bengal, the political ground is shifting beneath the feet of parties that relied on identity-based vote-bank calculations.

For the BJP, border security is no longer merely an administrative responsibility. It has become part of a larger political project. The slogan of "detect, delete and deport" has moved from campaign rhetoric to government policy.

Whether this approach delivers the results remains to be seen. But it is increasingly finding resonance among a large section of the population who believe that infiltration, demography and national security can no longer be discussed separately.

For decades, the issue of infiltration surfaced periodically in political debates and then faded from public attention. Today, it occupies the centre of national discourse. Whether the Modi government's approach ultimately succeeds or faces resistance, one thing is clear: border security is no longer being discussed only in terms of fences and checkpoints. It is now tied to questions of identity, representation, resources and the future character of regions along India's frontiers. After years of silence, the country is having a conversation it avoided for far too long.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 28 (SocialNews.XYZ) In the past few weeks, several Opposition parties have once again pushed for the revival of the INDIA bloc or the formation of a similar anti-Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP) platform amid the ruling party's expanding political footprint across the country, including in regions where it earlier struggled to open its account.

After Trinamool Congress chief Mamata Banerjee's call for a broader anti-BJP platform, her political rival, the Communist Party of India (Marxist), urged the INDIA bloc to reunite. This was followed by Samajwadi Party (SP) chief Akhilesh Yadav backing Congress leader Rahul Gandhi’s statement that the Union government would collapse within a year.

Almost every electoral success or political consolidation by the Prime Minister Narendra Modi-led National Democratic Alliance (NDA) appears to revive Opposition hopes of unity, even though many constituent parties continue to prefer contesting separately on the ground.

In Delhi, Arvind Kejriwal’s Aam Aadmi Party (AAP) contested the 2024 Lok Sabha elections in alliance with the Congress. However, the alliance failed to win any of the seven Parliamentary seats in the national capital.

In the subsequent Assembly elections, AAP chose to contest independently and eventually lost the electoral battle.

In West Bengal, Mamata Banerjee had consistently maintained distance from a broader Opposition alliance in practical political terms, but recent electoral setbacks appear to have renewed her interest in Opposition consolidation.

The INDIA bloc emerged out of political necessity when Opposition parties came together to counter PM Modi, driven by concerns over what they described as the Centre’s tightening grip over democratic institutions and the rise of assertive Hindu nationalism.

Despite deep internal contradictions, the alliance initially celebrated slowing the BJP’s momentum in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections, where the ruling party remained below the majority mark on its own with 240 seats.

However, any momentum towards deeper unity weakened soon after the results.

Parties began clashing over seat-sharing arrangements and regional influence. Several regional leaders accused the Congress of attempting to expand its footprint in states where regional parties considered themselves dominant political forces.

With Congress candidates contesting in constituencies where INDIA bloc allies expected accommodation, the grand old party was accused by some partners of undermining alliance discipline.

Amid episodes of cross-voting and internal distrust, Congress also faced criticism from allies who felt its leadership had failed to consolidate support among OBCs, EBCs and Dalits, while allegedly prioritising its own electoral interests.

Leaders such as Mamata Banerjee and Akhilesh Yadav were also reported to be uncomfortable projecting Rahul Gandhi as the face of the Opposition alliance, instead favouring a “collective leadership” structure.

In states such as Rajasthan, Chhattisgarh and Jharkhand, Opposition parties often fought fragmented campaigns despite calls for broader unity.

In West Bengal and Kerala, several alliance partners remain long-standing political rivals, making sustained cooperation difficult.

Recent Assembly election results have further tested the bloc’s cohesion. Electoral setbacks suffered by key regional players weakened some of the alliance’s strongest pillars, while simultaneously increasing concerns among allies about Congress becoming more dominant within the grouping.

Competitive positioning among alliance partners was also visible during seat-sharing negotiations ahead of last year’s Bihar elections.

Political observers say the challenge facing the INDIA bloc is not merely tactical but also structural and emotional, since several regional parties were historically built in opposition to the Congress itself.

Many allies continue to accuse the Congress of treating them as junior partners rather than political equals. Seat-sharing negotiations are frequently viewed by regional parties as being driven disproportionately by Congress calculations.

Rahul Gandhi's Bharat Jodo Yatra generated political visibility and support in sections of the Opposition ecosystem, but scepticism over leadership and electoral viability persists among several regional players.

The INDIA bloc thus continues to remain a broad but fragile coalition of more than two dozen parties united primarily by opposition to the PM Modi-led BJP, while remaining divided by leadership ambitions, regional compulsions and ideological contradictions.

Each state presents distinct electoral equations, making cohesive Opposition unity at the ground level difficult to sustain.

Although Akhilesh Yadav recently endorsed Rahul Gandhi’s remarks about the Union government and indicated that the INDIA bloc could jointly contest the 2027 Uttar Pradesh Assembly elections, political observers believe such statements currently remain more aspirational than organisationally concrete.

The alliance has not projected a consistently united political front since the declaration of the 2024 Lok Sabha election results.

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 22: The headlines last week, read like dispatches from a war room. Oil tankers rerouting around the Strait of Hormuz. Brent crude climbing by the hour. Fertiliser and diesel prices twitching in sympathy across continents. The war in Europe digging in for another summer with no armistice in sight. Into the middle of this frightened, churning world walked an Indian Prime Minister, boarding a flight to Abu Dhabi with the calm of a man who knew exactly what he had gone to fetch.

Six days later, after Abu Dhabi, The Hague, Gothenburg, Oslo and Rome, PM Modi flew home. He brought back no souvenirs. He brought back three shields, raised around a billion and a half people. Energy. Economy. Defence. The three things no nation can improvise once the world is already ablaze.

The storm, and the strategy

Understand first what kind of crisis this is. Not a single shock but a convergence of them. A war in West Asia threatening the arteries of global oil. A war in Europe that has scrambled the continent's energy and its grain, sending frightened capital racing back to whatever it imagines safe. In such a moment lesser governments freeze, issue statements and wait for the weather to change. PM Modi did the opposite. He read the map of India's vulnerabilities, picked five countries that each held a piece of the answer, and went to collect.

The First Shield: Energy

Roughly a fifth of the world's oil passes through the Strait of Hormuz, and a large share of India's crude comes from precisely that neighbourhood. When PM Modi recently urged citizens to go easy on petrol and to think twice before buying gold, the Prime Minister was not preaching austerity he was getting the nation a little time while he went out to secure its fuel supplies.

Abu Dhabi as the first stop was no accident. The Emirates, even while absorbing attacks on their own soil, committed 5 billion dollars in fresh investment to India and reaffirmed to keep our refineries humming. Then in Oslo, where no Indian PM had set foot in more than four decades, PM Modi went looking not for yesterday's oil but for tomorrow's fuel. Norway is among Europe's largest gas suppliers and a serious force in green hydrogen and offshore wind. The two nations sealed a Green Strategic Partnership, and the wider India Nordic summit produced a Green Tech and Strategic Partnership across all Nordic states. The message is simple. India will neither be held hostage by a single strait nor left behind in the energy transition.

The Second Shield: Economy

If energy keeps the lights on, the economy decides whether a country grows in the dark or shrinks in it. In The Hague, before PM Modi, Tata Electronics signed with ASML, the one Dutch firm on earth holding a monopoly on the extreme ultraviolet lithography machines without which no advanced chip can be made. This move provides Rs 91,000 crore semiconductor Fab at Dholera and quietly admits India into the most exclusive industrial club in the world.

Sweden holds some of Europe's richest deposits of critical minerals, the raw material of tomorrow's batteries and chips, and a new corridor will weave 6G, artificial intelligence and quantum computing into the partnership. Rome supplied the grand connective tissue. India and Italy elevated their ties to a Special Strategic Partnership and set a trade target of Euro 20 billion by 2029, while pushing forward the India Middle East Europe Economic Corridor, a route that will one day carry Indian goods to Europe in days rather than weeks, sidestepping the very chokepoints now under threat.

The Third Shield: Defence

A nation that cannot defend itself is finished. This third shield was the quietest of the three, and the most far-reaching. In Abu Dhabi, India and the UAE advanced a framework defence cooperation agreement of a breadth that would have seemed fanciful a decade ago. In Sweden, the defence major 'Saab' is now building its first military equipment plant anywhere outside its home country, at Jhajjar, India's first 100 per cent foreign funded defence manufacturing project. The Netherlands committed to a defence industrial roadmap linking manufacturers and research centres on both sides. The thread is unmistakable. India no longer wishes to remain the world's largest importer of arms. It means to make them at home, with the finest partners, on its own soil. Aatmanirbharta has stopped being a slogan. It has become a supply chain.

And the world rose to honour

There was a quieter dimension too. In Sweden, PM Modi was conferred the Royal Order of the Polar Star, that nation's highest honour. In Oslo, King Harald V invested him with the Grand Cross of the Royal Norwegian Order of Merit. And in a fitting coda, the UN Food and Agriculture Organisation handed him the Agricola Medal, for a food security net feeding some 800 million Indians and supporting over 110 million farmers. PM Modi accepted each in the name of the people of India. A generation ago this country went out into the world asking to be understood. Today the oldest monarchies of Europe rise to honour her. That shift, even more than any joint statement, is the truest measure of New India's strength.

The Opposition's hypocrisy

Congress-led Opposition sees none of this. Not the chip. Not the Saab line at Jhajjar. Not a Norwegian king's Grand Cross. It sees only an occasion to carp and rant. The hypocrisy is breathtaking. In November 1948, with Independence barely 15 months old, Bapu's assassination nine months past and Partition's refugees still sleeping on railway platforms, the then PM Jawaharlal Nehru took a full month to tour Europe. He returned and wrote, that what wearied him at home was the “pettiness and narrow mindedness” of his own countrymen. Nehru went to Europe for full month and came home complaining about Indians. PM Modi goes to the world for Indians and comes home with what India needs which is called statecraft.

The thread that binds them

Step away from the itinerary and the design stands clear. Energy from the Gulf and the Arctic. Economic muscle from chips, minerals and trade corridors. Defence built at home alongside the world's best. Three shields, raised in six days, against a storm that has paralysed several nations. The leaders of five capitals did not host PM Modi out of mere protocol. They hosted him because, in a world running scared, India has become the rare safe harbour where the prudent still place their longest bets. That standing was not gifted to us. It was earned, capital by capital.

A closing thought

The Colosseum has watched many empires but on Tuesday evening it watched something exemplary. Indian PM Modi who understands that in an age of fire, the wise nation does not shout. It builds. PM Modi spent six days raising three shields for a billion and a half people. The shields will certainly outlast the storm.

{The author is a Senior Advocate Practising in Supreme Court of India}

Source: IANS

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New Delhi: India has recently concluded deals with New Zealand, South Korea and Russia that are advantageous in headline terms, but signal more about India’s quest for strategic autonomy. They mark a deliberate shift in how New Delhi is deploying trade and defence alignment policies as calibrated levers of strategic autonomy amidst rising global rivalries and uncertainties. The agreements, different in scale and context, indicate a strategic logic: India is widening its economic and security options in a world where any singular dependence has become a strategic vulnerability.

The New Zealand Free Trade Agreement (FTA) might appear to be a relatively minor trade compact. But it provides assured access to a developed market while creating entry points into the wider Oceania region. At the same time, India has retained policy space by shielding politically sensitive sectors such as dairy and agriculture, reflecting a careful balancing of openness and domestic stability.

The South Korea agreement operates at a different level of ambition. Here, the objective is not just market access but structural integration into advanced industrial ecosystems. The defence dimensions of India’s engagement with South Korea, and other partners including Russia, reinforces this trend.

India’s continued defence and energy engagement with Russia underscores the persistence of a multi-vector approach.

What links these three deals is not their scale but their intent. India is no longer approaching trade and security agreements as standalone military or economic deals. Instead, they are being layered into a broader architecture of strategic autonomy — one that seeks diversification across partners, sectors, and geographies. India’s deals are increasingly anticipatory, designed to hedge against geopolitical volatility.

Rather than replacing one dependency with another, New Delhi appears intent on distributing its strategic relationships. Trade agreements, in this context, complement defence ties by broadening the economic base of these relationships, making them more resilient and less transactional.

The three deals signal India’s broader push for self-reliance in defence production, but without retreating into isolation. Instead, self-reliance is being pursued through selective integration—absorbing technology, building domestic capacity, and gradually reducing dependence. They also introduce a geopolitical signalling effect. Defence partnerships are rarely neutral. Expanding cooperation with South Korea inevitably intersects with regional dynamics, particularly in relation to China.

The push to upgrade the existing trade framework with Seoul, correct trade imbalances, and expand cooperation in semiconductors, shipbuilding, clean energy and critical minerals signals an attempt to embed India deeper into high-value supply chains. The target of doubling bilateral trade, coupled with institutional mechanisms such as economic security dialogues and industrial cooperation platforms, suggests that trade is being fused with industrial policy and strategic alignment.

The expansion of defence industrial cooperation with Seoul, particularly in artillery systems and advanced manufacturing, represents a shift from simple procurement to co-development and technology transfer. The progression from licensed production of platforms such as self-propelled howitzers to potential joint design of next-generation systems indicates an attempt to build indigenous capability while leveraging external partnerships.

These agreements must be situated within the changing global context. The old certainties of the trading system and national security alignments have eroded. Trade has become entangled with national security, technology control, and geopolitical rivalry. Supply chains are being reconfigured not for efficiency alone but for resilience. Economic relationships are now assessed as much for their strategic implications as for their national security value.

In such an environment, security and trade agreements are tools for managing risk. By entering into multiple overlapping agreements, countries are attempting to reduce reliance on any single partner or axis. This is particularly relevant for India, which must navigate a complex matrix of relationships—maintaining ties with the United States and Europe, managing a competitive coexistence with China, and preserving long-standing linkages with Russia.

The underlying logic is not to choose between rival geopolitical poles but to create optionality across them. Trade agreements become the connective tissue of this strategy with national security implications. They enable access to markets, capital, and technology, while also signalling compatibility with multiple economic and security systems. In this sense, India’s policy is evolving into a form of strategic triangulation, where diversification becomes the core of autonomy.

Yet this strategy has its risks. The expansion of trade agreements can expose domestic sectors to competitive pressures, particularly if safeguards are uneven or poorly implemented. Trade imbalances, as seen in India’s existing arrangement with South Korea, can persist or even widen if structural asymmetries are not addressed. Moreover, deeper integration into global value chains may come with implicit expectations on standards, alignment, or policy choices that could constrain autonomy over time.

Even so, the strategic direction is clear. India’s trade and defence alignment policies are being recast from defensive postures into strategic instruments. The agreements with New Zealand, South Korea and Russia are not endpoints but indicators of a larger global shift in a fragmenting and uncertain global order, and India’s quest to maintain autonomy therein.

(Vivek Y. Kelkar is a researcher and analyst whose work explores global power shifts, strategy, trade transitions, and the geopolitics of systemic risk. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 17: Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates (UAE) comes at a defining moment for West Asia. Amid rising tensions involving the United States and Iran, persistent concerns over the security of the Strait of Hormuz, and shifting geopolitical alignments across the Gulf, India’s decision to deepen its engagement with the UAE is both timely and strategically consequential.

What began centuries ago as maritime trade across the Arabian Sea has today evolved into one of the world’s most dynamic and forward-looking partnerships—anchored in mutual trust, economic complementarity, and a shared commitment to regional stability.

The India-UAE relationship has matured into a comprehensive strategic partnership spanning energy security, defence cooperation, technology, logistics, infrastructure, and investment. During this visit, both countries elevated ties through a Strategic Defence Partnership, agreements on crude oil reserves and LPG supplies, collaboration on a ship repair cluster, and a commitment for up to $5 billion in UAE investment into India. For a fast-growing economy like India, whose energy requirements will shape global demand for decades, the UAE is not merely a supplier but a trusted long-term strategic partner. At the same time, the UAE views India as a stable, large-scale market and a key pillar in its own economic diversification and global outreach strategy.

More importantly, this partnership represents the emergence of a new regional alignment led by pragmatic middle powers rather than external interventionist forces. India and the UAE are demonstrating that stability, prosperity, and strategic autonomy can be built through mutual respect, economic interdependence, and sovereign decision-making. As aptly noted, the relationship is underpinned by a rare degree of strategic trust. Prime Minister Modi’s visit reinforces that trust and signals the arrival of an Asian-led framework of cooperation capable of steering West Asia toward a more balanced, secure, and self-reliant future.

A Partnership Built on Trust and Shared Vision

Since Prime Minister Modi’s landmark visit to Abu Dhabi in 2015, bilateral ties have undergone a transformation. What was once largely transactional has become strategic and future-oriented.

The two countries have institutionalised cooperation through the Comprehensive Strategic Partnership and the Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA). These frameworks have accelerated trade, investment, defence cooperation, and technological collaboration.

The UAE is among India’s largest trading partners and one of its most important sources of foreign direct investment. Sovereign wealth funds from Abu Dhabi and Dubai have invested billions of dollars in Indian infrastructure, logistics, renewable energy, ports, and digital platforms.

At the human level, over 4.5 million Indians live and work in the UAE, making it home to the largest Indian expatriate community in the world. Their contribution has helped build the UAE’s remarkable economic success story while simultaneously strengthening India through remittances, entrepreneurship, and cultural goodwill.

Why Prime Minister Modi’s Visit Matters Now

Timing often determines strategic significance. Prime Minister Modi’s visit comes when West Asia is experiencing a period of profound uncertainty.

The Iran-related crisis has once again highlighted the fragility of global energy supply chains. Any disruption in the Strait of Hormuz can affect oil and gas shipments from Iraq, Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and other Gulf producers, with immediate consequences for developing economies.

For countries in Asia and Africa, high energy prices threaten to reverse a decade of development gains. Inflation, currency pressures, and supply disruptions could derail economic progress.

In this context, the Prime Minister’s visit conveys three critical messages:

India stands firmly with trusted strategic partners.Economic and energy cooperation will continue irrespective of regional instability.India and the UAE are committed to building a stable and development-oriented regional order.

This is a reaffirmation that strategic partnerships are tested most meaningfully during periods of uncertainty.

The Natural Strategic Advantage for India and the UAE

A unique and enduring strategic advantage in the India-UAE partnership lies in the location of Fujairah. Situated on the Gulf of Oman and outside the Strait of Hormuz, Fujairah offers the UAE—and its key partners such as India—a secure energy gateway that remains insulated from any short-term disruption or prolonged closure of the Hormuz chokepoint. At a time when maritime security in the Gulf is increasingly vulnerable to geopolitical tensions, this geographical advantage gives both countries an invaluable degree of strategic resilience.

For India, Fujairah represents a dependable and proximate source of uninterrupted energy supplies. Crude oil, LNG, and petroleum products can move directly across the Arabian Sea to India’s western coast without passing through one of the world’s most sensitive maritime bottlenecks. Existing cooperation on strategic petroleum reserves and long-term crude storage reflects this shared understanding. Going forward, India should actively partner with the UAE in expanding Fujairah’s port infrastructure, storage facilities, pipeline networks, and downstream refining and petrochemical projects. Such investments would help institutionalise a permanent India-UAE energy corridor, strengthen India’s long-term energy security, and transform Fujairah into a cornerstone of a future-oriented strategic partnership that both nations have a vital interest in protecting and developing.

Beyond Oil: The Strategic Depth of the Partnership

Economic Integration

The CEPA agreement has given new momentum to bilateral trade. Both countries aim to significantly expand non-oil trade, investment, and financial connectivity.

The UAE’s capital and India’s scale create a powerful economic combination. Whether in logistics, ports, food security, fintech, or infrastructure, the two countries complement each other naturally.

Defence and Security

Defence cooperation has expanded steadily through joint exercises, intelligence sharing, maritime security coordination, and counter-terrorism cooperation.

Both nations face common concerns related to regional instability, cyber threats, and the security of sea lanes. Their growing defence relationship reflects a high level of confidence and strategic trust.

Technology and Artificial Intelligence

One of the most forward-looking dimensions of the relationship is collaboration in artificial intelligence, semiconductors, and digital infrastructure.

India offers world-class software talent and cost-effective innovation. The UAE provides investment capital, advanced infrastructure, and a strategic ambition to become a global technology hub.

A jointly funded India-UAE AI Innovation Centre could become a transformative initiative, focusing on cybersecurity, governance, smart infrastructure, healthcare, and defence applications.

This combination of Indian intellectual capital and Emirati financial strength has the potential to create solutions relevant not just for both countries, but for the wider Global South.

The Regional Significance of the India-UAE Axis

West Asia is undergoing a strategic reordering. Differences among regional powers, competing external influences, and shifting alignments have created new uncertainties.

In this fluid environment, India and the UAE stand out for their pragmatic, development-oriented approach.

Neither seeks confrontation. Both prioritise stability, trade, infrastructure, and long-term prosperity.

This partnership has the potential to serve as a bridge linking:

South AsiaWest AsiaCentral AsiaEast AfricaSoutheast Asia

It can facilitate economic corridors, energy security arrangements, digital partnerships, and people-to-people exchanges that benefit a vast region.

India’s Distinctive Role

India enjoys trust across competing regional actors. It maintains strong relations with the UAE, Saudi Arabia, Iran, Israel, and other Gulf countries.

This balanced diplomacy gives India a unique ability to act as a stabilising force.

India does not approach the region through military alliances or ideological agendas. Its engagement is anchored in development, connectivity, and mutual respect.

This is consistent with India’s civilisational outlook of Vasudhaiva Kutumbakam—the world is one family.

By remaining outside regional rivalries while maintaining constructive relations with all sides, India is well positioned to support dialogue and encourage de-escalation when needed.

A Partnership for the Future

The India-UAE relationship represents a strategic model for the future.

It combines:

India’s demographic strength, technological talent, and strategic credibility.The UAE’s capital, global connectivity, and visionary leadership.

Together, they offer a partnership based not on dependency, but on shared growth and strategic trust.

At a time when many global relationships are transactional or crisis-driven, India and the UAE are building a long-term framework grounded in mutual benefit.

India and the UAE: A partnership whose strategic impact is seen and felt across the region

Prime Minister Narendra Modi’s visit to the United Arab Emirates underscores a larger strategic reality: India should not only remain a key partner of the UAE, but increasingly be regarded as its most dependable strategic friend and a credible guarantor of security, stability, and economic resilience in the wider region. In a geopolitical environment often shaped by shifting alignments and competing external agendas, the India-UAE partnership stands apart for its consistency, transparency, and deep reservoir of mutual trust.

This relationship has been tested during periods of regional conflict and market uncertainty, and has emerged stronger each time. Built on converging interests in energy security, defence cooperation, advanced technology, infrastructure, and investment, it is driven by practical outcomes rather than short-term calculations. India brings scale, technological capability, human capital, and strategic autonomy; the UAE contributes capital, global connectivity, and a forward-looking vision. Together, they have the capacity to create a stabilising axis that supports regional security and long-term prosperity.

As this partnership deepens, India’s role in the Gulf is evolving from that of an important economic partner to a trusted and strategic stakeholder, whose presence strengthens confidence across the region. The India-UAE relationship is therefore more than a bilateral success story—it is a game-changing model of cooperation that can help shape a more stable, balanced, and self-reliant West Asia.

((The author is a former diplomat and policy commentator focused on South Asian geopolitics, Tibet and India’s neighbourhood. He pens columns in leading dailies and contributes to leading think tanks.))

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 17 (SocialNews.XYZ) ‘Kerala will never forgive you’ -- the posters are likely to haunt the Gandhi siblings for a long time. These were not ordinary political posters meant to mock a leader or score a point. They were a bitter reflection of the kind of politics the Congress high command has increasingly found itself engaged in.

The posters mysteriously appeared in Wayanad, targeting Rahul Gandhi and Priyanka Gandhi Vadra over the Congress leadership’s inability to decide between K.C. Venugopal and V.D. Satheesan for the post of Kerala Chief Minister.

Wayanad is no ordinary constituency for the Gandhis. It is the seat from where Priyanka Gandhi Vadra registered her first Lok Sabha victory, and before that, Rahul Gandhi won twice with commanding margins. The constituency has long been considered politically safe for the family, given its demographic composition -- around 21.5 per cent Christians, 28.8 per cent Muslims, and nearly 49 per cent Hindus -- with minority communities largely backing the Congress.

The electorate has overwhelmingly voted for the Gandhis. Priyanka Gandhi Vadra won the November 2024 bypoll by a margin of 4,10,931 votes, surpassing the 3,64,422-vote margin with which Rahul Gandhi won the seat in the 2024 Lok Sabha elections. In 2019, Rahul Gandhi’s winning margin stood at 4,31,770 votes. Vadra secured nearly 65 per cent of the votes polled, while BJP candidate Navya Haridas received a little over 11 per cent.

So, when posters surfaced openly threatening the Gandhi siblings politically, the message had the effect, presumably. Soon after, the Congress leadership moved towards a decision on the Kerala Chief Minister.

The BJP was quick to describe the development as a decision taken under pressure. While the party itself has limited stakes in Kerala, the charge echoed a perception that had already begun to circulate.

The 2026 Kerala Assembly election also reinforced perceptions that the Indian Union Muslim League (IUML) has emerged as an unusually influential force within the United Democratic Front (UDF), despite the Congress winning 63 seats. The Congress party may have secured the largest number of seats in the UDF, but coalition realities meant it could not easily ignore the preferences of its second-largest ally.

In the high-stakes 2026 Assembly elections across four states and one union territory, national attention remained largely fixed on West Bengal. As a result, developments in Assam, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala did not receive the same scrutiny.

One striking feature of these elections has been the growing prominence of identity-based political mobilisation in several states, including the consolidation of Muslim political blocs in places like Assam and Kerala, and their evolving relationship with the Congress party.

Of the 19 Congress candidates who won in Assam, 18 are Muslims. In West Bengal, too, both newly elected Congress MLAs are Muslims. In Kerala, the IUML registered one of its strongest performances with 22 seats, placing itself in a position where it could significantly influence the Congress leadership’s decisions.

The increasing consolidation of community-based political influence in state Assemblies may eventually shape parliamentary politics as well. This is part of democratic representation, no doubt, but it is a trend that could deepen identity-driven politics. India’s political history offers enough examples to keep such concerns alive.

One of the most cited examples from post-Independence India remains the Shah Bano case. Several Muslim organisations, including the IUML, had opposed the Supreme Court verdict granting maintenance rights to Shah Bano, eventually pressuring the Rajiv Gandhi government to overturn the judgment legislatively. The episode continues to be seen as a defining moment in India’s debate over appeasement politics.

Over the years, organisations like the IUML have also opposed measures such as the criminalisation of instant triple talaq, the Citizenship Amendment Act (CAA), and the Waqf Amendment Act.

In a democracy, minorities have every right to political representation and to voice their concerns. But religion-based consolidation in politics has carried historical consequences as well. This politics has historically remained a sensitive subject in India because of the Partition experience and the deep communal scars it left behind. In 1947, the All-India Muslim League under Muhammad Ali Jinnah spearheaded the movement that led to the creation of Pakistan.

After Partition, the original Muslim League ceased to exist in India, but the Indian Union Muslim League was formed in 1948 and gradually established itself as a significant political force in Kerala. Some of its early leaders had roots in the pre-Partition Muslim League.

The Congress party’s alliance with the IUML has often drawn criticism from opponents, despite describing itself as a secular party and the BJP as communal. Political arrangements exist between regional parties and influential Muslim groupings in several states. Parties have often reduced communities into electoral blocs, rather than treating them as broader participants in governance.

It was against this backdrop that the Wayanad posters triggered alarm within the Congress party. The language was unusually direct. One poster read, “Mr Rahul and Priyanka, forget Wayanad. You won’t win again from here.” Another declared, “This is not a warning. Kerala will never forgive you for this blunder.” A third said, “Mr Rahul, KC might be your bag bearer, but the people of Kerala will never forgive you.”

Who put up these posters may never be conclusively known. But they appear to have had the intended political effect. Rahul Gandhi eventually backed Satheesan, who was widely believed to be the preferred choice of the IUML leadership. Congress may insist that the decision reflected feedback from grassroots workers, but the perception of pressure remains difficult to dismiss entirely.

What unfolded in Kerala may be interpreted as the compulsions of coalition politics. It has also revived a larger debate over whether Congress is becoming increasingly dependent on identity-based political alignments. Assam’s AIUDF chief Badruddin Ajmal has even remarked that Congress is turning into a “Muslim League”.

Nearly seven decades ago, Rahul Gandhi’s great-grandfather and India’s first Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had openly criticised the IUML, describing it as a communal organisation. During an election speech in Kozhikode in 1957, he had referred to the Muslim League as a “dead horse”, and also remarked that while the Muslim League had gone to Pakistan after Partition, “a little bit of its tail” had remained behind in Malabar.

What Jawaharlal Nehru once described as communal is today defended by many within the Congress party as part of secular coalition politics. And perhaps, in the sharp language of those Wayanad posters, the Gandhi siblings got a glimpse of the consequences of indulging in such loaded politics.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 10 (SocialNews.XYZ) When the Election Commission of India confirmed a record-breaking final voter turnout of 92.47% across two phases, representing the highest-ever poll participation in West Bengal since Independence, surpassing the previous record of 84.72% set in 2011, this figure is not merely a statistical achievement.

It is a declaration of democratic will by a population that had been systematically suppressed, intimidated, and taken for granted at the polls for generations. In previous elections, there had been documented cases of high-rise complexes being locked up by mobs linked to the ruling party during elections, a practice observed since the Left era. The TMC had continuously opposed the setting up of booths in such complexes by the Election Commission of India. The 92.93% turnout is therefore not simply enthusiasm; it is defiance.

The granular data from Muslim-majority constituencies tells a story that demands careful, honest reading, and Muslims across India need to read it without defensiveness and without the distorting lens of partisan allegiance.

Across the 27 seats in the state assembly that the BJP won where the Muslim population exceeds 30%, the party's average vote share jumped by 7.44 percentage points, from approximately 38.9% in 2021 to approximately 46.3% in 2026, while the TMC's average vote share declined by 10.79 percentage points, from approximately 49% in 2021 to 38.2% in 2026. Let us walk through specific constituencies to understand the texture of this transformation.

In Jangipur, a constituency where Muslims constitute 56% of the electorate, the result was nothing short of seismic. The BJP exploded from just 22.17% to 42.90%, gaining nearly 47,000 votes, while the TMC collapsed dramatically from 68.82% to 37.94%. The Congress took a substantial 14.69% share, almost entirely drawn from Muslim voters who had previously backed the TMC.

In Beldanga, the highest-Muslim seat on the list with a 63% Muslim population, the story was one of extraordinary fragmentation. The BJP rose only modestly from 28.86% to 31.88%. But the TMC collapsed catastrophically from 55.19% to 26.10%, a stunning fall of 29 percentage points. The Aam Janata Unnayan Party took 20.43%, and the Congress took 17.48%, together accounting for nearly 38% of the total vote, clearly representing the Muslim vote that deserted the TMC and, crucially, a vote that did not migrate to the BJP.

In Kandi, a constituency with 51% Muslim population, the BJP won with 36.78% while the TMC received 31.60%, the Congress took 15.62%, and the AIMIM polled 11.52%. Together, the Congress and AIMIM accounted for nearly 27% of the total vote, clearly representing the Muslim electorate that had broken away from the TMC. In Nabagram, the BJP rose from 31.14% to 35.54%, while the TMC collapsed from 48.18% to 32.86%, with the Congress surging to 22.63%, the bulk of the Muslim vote that deserted the TMC flowing not to the BJP but to the Congress.

In the Murshidabad constituency itself, the BJP held the seat with a massive swing, surging from 41.86% to 48.18% while the TMC collapsed from 40.78% to 34.91%, with the INC, AIFB, and smaller parties dividing the remainder.

The district-level shift in Murshidabad was dramatic by any measure. The BJP won nine of Murshidabad's 22 seats, up from just two in 2021. The TMC, which had won 20 seats in the district in 2021, was reduced to nine.

Now, a question that honest political analysis demands we address directly: did Pasmanda Muslims vote for the BJP in significant numbers? The data from the most rigorous available analysis is unambiguous. Across all 27 Muslim-majority seats that the BJP won, the final verdict of the analysis was that there was no evidence of significant direct Muslim support for the BJP. In Beldanga, the highest-Muslim seat on the list, the BJP rose only modestly, and the Muslim vote that deserted the TMC went primarily to the Congress, the AIMIM, and regional formations rather than to the BJP.

This finding, far from diminishing the significance of what I am arguing, actually deepens it. The Pasmanda Muslim's political message in Bengal 2026 was not, or not primarily, "we choose the BJP." It was: "we refuse to be your unconditional property." The Muslim vote fractured across multiple formations, namely Congress, AIMIM, the Aam Janata Unnayan Party, and the Left Front, in a conscious act of democratic assertion.

In high-Muslim seats such as Baisnabnagar, Nabagram, Kandi, Beldanga, Jangipur, and Burwan, the Congress captured substantial chunks of what had previously been the TMC's Muslim support base, directly contributing to the TMC's collapse. The message was unmistakable: the Pasmanda Muslim community will distribute its votes according to its own calculus of interest, grievance, and aspiration, not according to the instructions of self-appointed community custodians.

The consequence of this fragmentation, in the mathematics of multi-cornered contests, was the BJP's victory. In a three-way contest, one typically requires a minimum of 33% of the votes to secure a victory. In a fiercely contested four-way battle, one can potentially win with as little as 28-29% of the vote.

The Pasmanda Muslims, by refusing to vote as a bloc for the TMC, did not necessarily vote for the BJP, but in refusing to serve as the TMC's captive constituency, they enabled a BJP victory. This distinction is critical, and it carries within it the most important political lesson of our time: the power of a community lies not only in whom it votes for, but in whom it withholds its vote from.

The national context for this shift has been building for years. By 2017, 12.6% of general Muslims and 8% of Pasmanda Muslims in Uttar Pradesh reported support for the BJP in state elections. By the 2022 UP state elections, BJP support among general Muslims had fallen to 9.8%, while support among Pasmanda Muslims had risen to 9.1%, a significant convergence that signals the Pasmanda community making increasingly independent political assessments.

Research from the Lokniti Network at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies suggests that appealing to the poor among Muslims has demonstrably helped the BJP in regional elections, increasing its vote share among Muslims in states such as Gujarat and Karnataka.

Surveys conducted ahead of the 2024 Lok Sabha elections disclosed that Muslim voting behaviour was gravitating toward sub-caste identities rather than consolidating around a monolithic religious bloc, a trend with profound implications for every party that has depended on treating the Muslim electorate as a homogeneous mass.

(The writer is National Working President, All India Pasmanda Muslim Mahaz)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 10 (SocialNews.XYZ) There was something unusual about the reaction to the Assembly election results this time. State elections in India routinely produce celebrations, accusations, posturing and political drama. But the outcome in West Bengal travelled far beyond India's borders.

From Dhaka to Washington, the result triggered reactions rarely seen after a state poll in India. That alone suggested that what happened in Bengal was not being viewed merely as a regional political shift. It was being read as something larger -- a strategic and ideological development in one of India's most sensitive border states. And, the international attention it attracted was equally striking.

US President Donald Trump congratulated Prime Minister Narendra Modi on what the White House described as a "historic" and "decisive" mandate in West Bengal. Several international publications portrayed the result as a breakthrough moment for PM Modi in a state that had remained politically resistant to the BJP for years.

The obvious question is: why did a state election command such extraordinary global attention? Victories in Haryana, Rajasthan or Chhattisgarh do not evoke reactions of this scale abroad. West Bengal, however, occupies a different place in India's political imagination. Geography and demography make it uniquely sensitive. Sharing a long and porous border with Bangladesh, the state has for years remained central to debates around illegal infiltration, border security and demographic change.

For years, the BJP has argued that the Mamata Banerjee government looked the other way while infiltration from Bangladesh continued unchecked. The allegations are not new.

Ironically, Mamata Banerjee herself once raised similar concerns. In 2005, as a Lok Sabha member, she had dramatically protested in Parliament over infiltration from Bangladesh, calling it a "disaster" for the country. On the streets of West Bengal, too, she repeatedly accused the then Left Front government of using illegal immigrants as a political vote bank.

But politics often reshapes positions faster than circumstances change. After coming to power in 2011, Mamata Banerjee's stand appeared to undergo a sharp reversal. The issue that once formed the centrepiece of her political attacks gradually disappeared from her rhetoric. Instead, she became one of the fiercest critics of attempts to identify or deport illegal immigrants.

The sharpest example came during the Assam NRC exercise in 2018. While the Supreme Court-monitored process sought to identify illegal immigrants in Assam, Mamata Banerjee openly attacked the exercise, warning of "civil war" and "bloodbath" if the Centre continued with the policy. This opposition was aimed at protecting a political support base shaped over years of unchecked migration.

The BJP repeatedly built its Bengal campaign around this accusation. Union Home Minister Amit Shah, while speaking in Parliament during the debate on the Immigration and Foreigners Bill in March 2025, directly accused the Trinamool Congress government of enabling illegal immigration by facilitating the issuance of Aadhaar cards and voter IDs. He claimed that many Bangladeshis caught in different parts of the country possessed documents originating from West Bengal's border districts, including the 24 Parganas.

Infiltration has remained a contentious issue in Bengal for decades. Border districts have witnessed demographic shifts significant enough to alter political calculations. Security agencies have repeatedly flagged concerns about illegal cross-border networks. The issue is no longer viewed merely through the lens of economics or welfare distribution; it is increasingly tied to questions of national security and internal stability.

The reactions emerging from Bangladesh after the election have only added to these anxieties. While sections of Bangladesh's political establishment reportedly sent congratulatory messages to the BJP leadership, some Islamist voices reacted sharply against the Bengal verdict.

One Jamaat-e-Islami leader reportedly made inflammatory remarks calling for resistance against Delhi and spoke irresponsibly about Bengal's separation from India. Such statements may represent fringe rhetoric, but they underline why political developments in West Bengal are being watched so closely beyond India's borders. In Pakistan, discussions were held on the development, with many describing Mamata Banerjee's defeat as a setback for the Indian opposition.

The intensity of these reactions reveals something important. Beyond Bengal, Mamata Banerjee had increasingly come to be viewed by many political and ideological groups as one of the strongest leaders capable of taking on Prime Minister Narendra Modi nationally. Her politics, often seen as centred around Muslim outreach, had earned her support among sections that viewed the BJP's rise with concern.

That is why her defeat generated unusually sharp reactions outside India as well. While vested interests and ideological groups in neighbouring countries may interpret the result through their own political lens, the verdict delivered by Bengal's voters is clear and strong.

Now, with the BJP forming the government in Bengal with a commanding mandate, expectations will be enormous. The party has promised a tougher stance on infiltration, stronger border management, expanded fencing and stricter enforcement against illegal residency networks.

Bengal has suffered enough through decades of political violence, fear, religious polarisation and uneven development. This election was not merely a rejection of Mamata Banerjee's 15-year rule; it was also an expression of exhaustion and aspiration.

The people of Bengal have voted for security over violence and uncertainty, development over appeasement, and governance over perpetual conflict. They want jobs for the youth, better roads and infrastructure, dignity in everyday life, and the freedom to live.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 6 (SocialNews.XYZ) For nearly half a century, political rulers in West Bengal defied, challenged and even ridiculed those at the Centre while fiercely defending their fortress -- much like the tiny Gaulish village imagined by Rene Goscinny and Albert Uderzo in the popular Asterix-Obelix series.

As depicted in the immensely popular comic books, the inhabitants often fought among themselves, but united whenever confronted by those they branded as "outsiders".

Unlike the fictional Gaulish village, however, internal conflicts gradually weakened the shield bearers in West Bengal in their own ways, leading to the erosion of support for their own Chief Vitalstatistix. And eventually, the heavens truly fell -- the very fear that constantly haunted the Chief.

First, it was the Left Front. Then came the Trinamool Congress government.

This time, the last major eastern bastion too appeared dented, with a surge of silent voices emerging from among those suffering amid factional feuds and administrative drift. They sought change.

Sensing the shield slipping from beneath his feet, Chief Vitalstatistix would perhaps have realised too late the importance of the magic potion prepared by Getafix, the village druid.

For West Bengal, that "druid" was Mukul Roy, who silently managed the organisation, especially during elections, while Trinamool Congress supremo Mamata Banerjee led the party from the front.

The subsequent rise of Mamata Banerjee's nephew, Abhishek Banerjee, within the organisation, coupled with his no-compromise style and growing dependence on outside consultants, reportedly left leaders such as Mukul Roy, Saumitra Khan and Suvendu Adhikari feeling increasingly alienated.

The Nandigram movement, which helped Mamata Banerjee dethrone the Left Front government in 2011, was largely planned, coordinated and spearheaded on the ground by Suvendu Adhikari.

He steadily rose through the party ranks but was later believed to have felt sidelined.

Suvendu Adhikari shot into national prominence soon after joining the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), particularly after defeating his former political mentor in 2021, when Mamata Banerjee chose to contest against him from the Nandigram Assembly constituency.

His stature rose further this time when he not only retained Nandigram but also successfully defeated the Trinamool Congress supremo in her own stronghold of Bhabanipur.

Like Suvendu Adhikari, Saumitra Khan too shifted to the BJP, claiming he felt slighted within the Trinamool Congress and criticising the party over what he described as its lack of direction.

He alleged that the party was increasingly being run by Abhishek Banerjee and said he felt neglected despite his contributions to the organisation.

Perhaps the biggest blow was the exit of Mukul Roy, whose name is said to have figured in the documents submitted by the Trinamool Congress while registering itself with the Election Commission as a political party in 1997-98.

Insiders claimed that he too was unhappy with the younger Banerjee’s growing influence within the party.

The former Railway Minister passed away early last year while suffering from multiple ailments, including Parkinson's disease.

Mukul Roy was known for his efficient election management skills and had long been regarded as one of Mamata Banerjee's closest confidants, often seen as the party’s second-in-command.

He was also reportedly involved in strategising the BJP’s political expansion in West Bengal after joining the saffron camp.

However, both Mukul Roy and Suvendu Adhikari were believed to have faced the party’s wrath after being named in connection with the Narada sting operation.

Yet, several others who had also featured in the sting tapes continued to remain within the party leadership.

Meanwhile, Mamata Banerjee’s grip over both the organisation and administration appeared to weaken steadily, with several party leaders clashing publicly even as allegations of corruption and incidents of crime in the state continued to rise.

By then, two parallel centres of power had emerged within the party, at least in public perception.

One camp centred around Mamata Banerjee was referred to as the “Kalighat” or “Harish Chatterjee” group, named after the locality of her residence, while the other revolved around Abhishek Banerjee and was known as the “Camac Street” camp, after the location of its office.

The situation increasingly resembled the functioning of earlier Left Front governments, where the organisation and administration operated under distinct leadership structures, with the organisational leadership often prevailing during crucial moments.

Even at the peak of the RG Kar protest movement, the “Camac Street” camp appeared to favour a measured administrative response, while Mamata Banerjee was perceived by many as uncertain and under pressure.

Abhishek Banerjee took to social media to condemn the brutal rape and murder and publicly shared his instructions to the police seeking immediate action against those accused of attacking protestors.

That appeared to galvanise the administration into stronger action later.

Had Goscinny and Uderzo been around to chronicle “when the tiny Gaulish village fell”, their account might have featured an unhappy Obelix — upset with the druid for denying him the magic potion because he was already considered too powerful after falling into a cauldron as a child.

And their Asterix would perhaps have constantly looked over his shoulder to ensure that Obelix was still beside him during the "boar hunt".

And then, the heavens fell.

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, May 3 (SocialNews.XYZ) In February 2019, Mamata Banerjee wrote an 18-line poem titled 'Key', lamenting what she saw as a 'shrinking' democratic space under the regime at the Centre. The poem spoke of voices being stifled, of lips metaphorically locked, and of a reckoning that would one day confront those in power. It was a political message wrapped in verse -- sharp, accusatory, and unambiguous in its intent.

Seven years on, those very lines seem to echo differently -- an uncomfortable reflection of realities.

When hundreds of residents, mostly women, in the Falta area of South 24 Parganas took to the streets on May 2, alleging threats and intimidation by Trinamool Congress workers, the essence of that poem stood exposed. Mamata Banerjee has repeatedly invoked the language of democracy and rights in her attacks on the Modi-led government at the Centre, but moments like these have a way of holding up a mirror.

For years, CM Banerjee has taken on the Bharatiya Janata Party-led government at the Centre, accusing it of undermining institutions and eroding democratic norms. That narrative has been central to her political positioning, but the 2026 Assembly election has, in many ways, peeled back layers that had long remained obscured.

Fifteen years of uninterrupted rule by the Trinamool Congress have created a deeply entrenched system -- one where the lines between political authority and local muscle have blurred.

Allegations of voter suppression, coercion, and systemic intimidation are no longer confined to opposition rhetoric; they are increasingly finding expression in public protests and on-the-ground accounts. There have been even reports -- denied by the ruling party -- of voters in gated communities being discouraged or prevented from stepping out to vote.

The fact that the Election Commission of India found it necessary to set up polling booths within certain residential complexes points to an environment where access to voting itself became a concern.

Equally troubling were visuals that circulated widely: the symbol of a political party reportedly obscured on Electronic Voting Machines. BJP candidate Debangshu Panda accused the Trinamool Congress of deliberately obstructing voters from casting ballots in the BJP's favour. Such claims raise serious questions about procedural integrity. Election guidelines are clear -- every candidate's symbol must remain visible. That these incidents could occur at all leads to an obvious question: Were they overlooked, ignored, or was there any threat?

The Falta protests also brought forward specific accusations. Some of the women named individuals they claimed had threatened or attacked them, pointing towards links with local political figures, including Jahangir Khan. Khan, in turn, made headlines for issuing open threats to a Central observer, Ajay Pal Sharma, even invoking the possibility of violence against security forces. Khan is widely believed to be close to Abhishek Banerjee, Mamata Banerjee's nephew and a key figure within the party. Abhishek himself drew attention for remarks directed at the same Central observer, stating that he will see who comes to his rescue from Delhi after May 4.

What makes this moment significant is not just the incidents themselves, but the fact that they are no longer whispered about in private or dismissed as partisan exaggeration. They are out in the open, shaping public perception in real time.

West Bengal has, in recent years, witnessed a series of episodes that have raised questions about governance and institutional integrity. The murder of a young female doctor within the premises of RG Kar Medical College and Hospital had sparked widespread outrage. The protests that followed gradually lost momentum, with several participants alleging pressure and punitive actions, including transfers. Some of these actions were challenged before the Calcutta High Court.

Corruption allegations have also cast a long shadow. Several ministers and leaders, including Partha Chatterjee, Firhad Hakim, late Subrata Mukherjee, Madan Mitra, Sovan Chatterjee, Anubrata Mandal, have faced investigations and arrests in cases involving substantial financial irregularities. The recovery of large amounts of cash and valuables during the ED raid at Partha Chatterjee's shocked many, not just for the scale involved, but for what it suggested about the depth of the problem.

In April 2025, the Supreme Court upheld the cancellation of over 25,000 teaching and non-teaching appointments linked to irregularities in a 2016 recruitment process. It was a decision with far-reaching consequences -- affecting livelihoods on one hand, and exposing systemic corruption on the other. In most circumstances, such a verdict would trigger widespread political churn. The relatively muted response from large sections of the opposition, barring the BJP, stood out.

The truth is that the 2026 Assembly elections could prove to be a watershed moment in Bengal's history. They have, in many ways, fully exposed the very system that Mamata Banerjee once fought against to come to power 15 years ago, but has since gone on to replicate and entrench. The methods she once opposed have now become the means through which she has sustained her hold on power.

Her remarkable feat of single-handedly dislodging the Left's long rule now stands overshadowed by her presiding over a corrupt, exploitative system as revealed by the numerous cases in the courts.

Images of her obstructing an ED raid at the I-PAC office in Kolkata and removing files from the spot are likely to linger. So too will the incident in Malda, where a group of judicial officers was allegedly held hostage for nearly nine hours, and their convoy was later chased by a mob on over 30 bikes after their release. An audio message from one of the women officers to the High Court, describing her fear and distress during the ordeal and urging authorities to take care of her children if anything were to happen to her, underscores the gravity of the situation.

Today, the criticism she faces is rooted in a perception that the very methods she once opposed have, over time, found a place within her own administration.

The images of protesters on the streets, the accounts of voters struggling to exercise their franchise, and the recurring allegations of coercion -- all of these form a narrative that is difficult to ignore. They may not tell the entire story of governance in West Bengal, but they certainly tell a part of it that demands attention.

In the end, the irony is hard to miss. A poem once written to warn against the erosion of democracy now reads like an unintended mirror. Whether that reflection leads to introspection -- or is dismissed as political noise -- will shape not just an election outcome, but the direction in which the state moves next.

For Mamata Banerjee, the questions are no longer just about political positioning. They are about credibility, consistency, and the gap between words and lived reality. And those are not questions that can be answered by poetry alone.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 26 (SocialNews.XYZ) At a time when conflicts are expanding beyond borders and affecting regions far removed from the battlefield, the teachings of Buddha Dhamma offer not only moral guidance but also a practical framework for resolving crises. The present tensions involving Iran, the United States and Israel, along with their cascading impact on energy routes, trade systems and vulnerable populations, underline a deeper failure. It is not merely a failure of diplomacy but a failure to understand interdependence, restraint and the consequences of unchecked greed.

Buddha Dhamma, as preserved in the Nalanda tradition, is not an abstract philosophy. It is a lived and tested approach to human conflict.

Beyond Teaching: Buddha Intervenes

“Conquer anger by non-anger; conquer evil by good; conquer the miser with generosity and the liar with truth.”

The Buddha did not remain a silent observer of conflict. Historical accounts show that he intervened directly to prevent wars. One of the most well-known instances was the dispute over the Rohini River between the Shakyas and Koliyas. Instead of invoking doctrine, he appealed to reason, asking whether the value of human life was worth less than water. The conflict was resolved without bloodshed.

At the same time, there were limits to intervention. When his own clan faced destruction due to their past actions, the Buddha stepped aside, recognising that the law of cause and effect cannot be overridden. This dual approach is important. It teaches that peace efforts must be sincere and persistent, but also grounded in an understanding of deeper causes.

This is where modern conflict resolution often fails. There is intervention without introspection, negotiation without accountability, and strategy without moral clarity.

The Central Problem of Greed in Modern Conflicts

“There is no fire like greed, no grip like hatred…”

Buddha Dhamma identifies greed, hatred and ignorance as the root causes of suffering. Among these, greed has taken a highly organised and sophisticated form in modern geopolitics. It is no longer individual but systemic. It operates through control of resources, trade routes and strategic dominance.

Many contemporary conflicts, including those in West Asia, cannot be separated from competition over energy routes, economic leverage and geopolitical influence. These are often presented as matters of security or national interest, but at their core lies an expansion of desire beyond legitimate need.

Even history supports this understanding. Emperor Ashoka, after the Kalinga war, realised the futility of conquest driven by ambition. He turned to Dhamma as a guiding principle for governance, while still maintaining an army for protection. This distinction remains critical. Defence for protection is fundamentally different from expansion for advantage.

Doctrine of Dependent Origination and Global Interdependence

“Avijja-paccaya sankhara, sankhara-paccaya vinnaṇam, vedana-paccaya taṇha, taṇha-paccaya upadanam, upadana-paccaya bhavo…”

This is not just metaphysics; it is a causal model of conflict:

“With feeling as condition, craving arises;

with craving as condition, clinging arises;

with clinging as condition, becoming arises…”

One of the most profound teachings of Buddha Dhamma is the doctrine of dependent origination. It explains that everything arises in dependence on causes and conditions. Nothing exists in isolation.

In today’s world, this principle is visible in its most tangible form. Energy routes, supply chains and financial systems connect nations in ways that make conflict self-damaging. A disruption in one region affects economies across continents. When shipping lanes are threatened or oil supplies are interrupted, the impact is felt not only by powerful nations but more severely by weaker economies.

Control over resources is pursued as a sign of strength, without recognising that such control creates vulnerability through interdependence.

Nature, Climate and the ethics of shared resources

“One should use wealth…for one’s needs, for supporting others, and for safeguarding the future.”

Buddha Dhamma also emphasises harmony with nature. What is taken from nature without balance returns in the form of suffering. Climate change is a modern expression of this imbalance.

Natural resources were never meant to be monopolised. When they are controlled and monetised beyond equitable limits, it creates structural inequality and conflict. Energy routes, water systems and environmental resources are shared by nature but divided by human ambition.

This raises an important ethical question. What is legal is not always just. True illegality, in a broader sense, lies in violating the natural order that sustains all life.

The present crisis, whether seen through climate stress or geopolitical conflict, reflects a departure from this balance. The more nations attempt to dominate natural systems, the more instability they create for themselves.

Lessons for the Present Iran Conflict

The current tensions involving Iran and its regional and global stakeholders must be seen through this wider lens. The issue is not limited to immediate triggers but extends to long-standing patterns of mistrust, control and strategic competition.

Ignoring the dependence of global systems on stable energy flows and cooperative frameworks is a serious oversight. Nations that appear strong today are equally vulnerable to disruptions tomorrow. The resilience often lies with those who have learned to adapt rather than dominate.

Buddha Dhamma would advise a shift from positional negotiation to understanding causation. Why has the conflict persisted? What interests are being protected? Who bears the cost? Without addressing these questions, any agreement will remain temporary.

A Call for Collective Responsibility

“Whatever one does, good or bad, that one will inherit.”

At this stage, the responsibility does not lie only with governments. It extends to thinkers, religious leaders, philosophers and senior political figures. Silence in the face of escalating conflict is no longer a neutral position.

There is a need for a universal voice that transcends national interests and calls for restraint. This does not mean passivity. It means active engagement to prevent destruction. Even if pressure or force is required, it must be directed towards enforcing peace, not prolonging conflict.

The principle of non-violence in Buddha Dhamma is not weakness. It is a disciplined approach to preventing greater harm. It requires courage to question prevailing narratives and to challenge the structures that benefit from conflict.

Conclusion: The Choice Before Humanity

History has consistently shown that wars are easy to start but impossible to fully control. Once initiated, they develop their own momentum and consequences that extend far beyond original intentions. The lesson is not only political but civilisational. Every major conflict eventually escapes the calculations of those who begin it.

Buddha Dhamma offers a path that is both ethical and practical. Understand the cause, recognise interdependence, restrain greed and act with compassion. These are not idealistic notions but necessary conditions for survival in an interconnected world. The Buddha did not merely preach peace; he demonstrated how conflicts can be diffused by addressing their roots. His intervention in the Rohini river dispute showed that reason and proportion can prevent destruction. At the same time, his decision to step aside in the case of his own clan reflected a deeper truth that actions carry consequences which cannot always be avoided.

Ancient wisdom traditions consistently reinforce this approach. The teaching of dependent origination explains that no conflict remains local. It spreads through invisible chains of cause and effect. This is visible today in disruptions of energy supply, trade routes and economic stability across regions that are not even directly involved in the conflict. Similarly, the principle of non-violence is not passive restraint but an active effort to prevent larger harm. Emperor Ashoka’s transformation after Kalinga remains one of the strongest examples of how power can be redirected from conquest to moral responsibility, while still ensuring protection.

A most relevant teaching of the Buddha comes from the Dhammapada:

“Na hi verena verani sammantidha kudacanaṃ; averena ca sammanti, esa dhammo sanantano.”

Hatred is never appeased by hatred at any time, but by non-hatred alone. This is an eternal law.

This principle is not limited to personal conduct. It applies equally to states and leadership. Retaliation driven by anger only deepens cycles of conflict, while restraint guided by wisdom creates space for resolution. Another teaching from the Samyutta Nikaya on dependent origination reminds us that suffering arises from causes and conditions. Unless these causes are addressed, outcomes cannot change. Modern conflict management often ignores this fundamental truth.

The present moment is a test of collective wisdom. Those who continue to drive the world towards conflict for short-term gains will not escape the consequences. History will judge them not by their power but by the suffering they leave behind.

It is time to return to a universal approach rooted in ancient wisdom. The Nalanda tradition, with its emphasis on reasoning, dialogue and compassion, provides that foundation. The world must raise its voice strongly enough to compel peace. Thinkers, religious leaders, philosophers and senior political figures must step forward with clarity and courage. Silence or neutrality in such times becomes indirect support for destruction.

The world stands at a point where continued escalation can lead to irreversible changes in global order, economy and human security.

The choice is clear. Either humanity recognises its shared dependence and acts decisively for peace, or it allows conflict to expand until it becomes self-destructive. The window for wisdom is still open, but it is narrowing rapidly.

(The author is a former diplomat and strategic affairs expert. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 26 (SocialNews.XYZ) Financial scams -- chit funds, Ponzi schemes -- have victims who lose their savings, but when a political movement built on honesty and hope begins to crumble, the loss is far deeper. Because what is taken away is not just wealth, but trust in the very idea of change.

Politics, at its best, is supposed to be different. It is not meant to serve. That is why the rise of the India Against Corruption movement in 2011 felt like a turning point. The country was weary. The UPA-2 government was battling one corruption scandal after another, and public anger had been building for years. Right into that moment stepped Anna Hazare -- quiet, austere, and invoking a language of protest that people understood.

What followed was not just another agitation. It became a national moment. Streets filled up, social media carried the message further, and for once, the middle class -- often accused of staying on the sidelines -- showed up in large numbers. The movement felt organic. It was less about ideology and more about a shared frustration.

Around Hazare gathered a group that gave the movement direction -- Arvind Kejriwal, Kiran Bedi, Prashant Bhushan, Yogendra Yadav, Kumar Vishwas, and others. Hazare's 12-day fast forced the government to respond, and for a brief stretch, it felt as if something real might come out of it. There was, in that moment, a sense of possibility that is rare in public life.

The shift, however, came when the movement entered politics. Hazare was not convinced -- he believed its strength lay in staying outside the system. But Kejriwal took a different call. In 2012, the Aam Aadmi Party was formed, carrying forward the language of the movement into the electoral arena.

The appeal was immediate. A party of the "common man", promising clean governance and accessibility, struck a chord across sections. The broom became more than a symbol -- it became a shorthand for expectation. And then came the results.

After a brief 49-day government, AAP returned in 2015 with a mandate that was almost absolute -- 67 out of 70 seats in Delhi. It was the kind of victory that leaves little space for doubt. Congress disappeared from the map, the BJP was reduced to three, and Kejriwal took office with enormous goodwill.

For many, this felt like validation -- that politics could still surprise, that change was not just a slogan.

But this is also where the story begins to turn. Differences within the party started surfacing. Leaders who had been central to the movement began raising concerns -- about how decisions were being made, about the space for disagreement. Yogendra Yadav and Prashant Bhushan were among the first to be pushed out after questioning the leadership. They spoke openly about the party drifting away from its original ideals.

They were not the last. Over time, familiar faces kept dropping off -- Kumar Vishwas, Shazia Ilmi, Kapil Mishra, Ashutosh, among others. The reasons differed, but the pattern did not. The party began to look less like a collective and more like a tightly held structure under one person, where dissent appeared to have little room.

But, it did not succumb; electorally, it held its ground. In 2020, AAP returned to power in Delhi with another strong mandate. With this electoral confidence, in 2022, it expanded into Punjab with a sweeping victory and formed a government under Bhagwant Mann. The party even began testing the waters in other states, such as Goa and Gujarat.

From the outside, it still looked like a success story. But the questions were getting harder to ignore.

Allegations -- political, legal, administrative -- started piling up. The party's handling of difficult moments -- including ministers/leaders getting entangled in various criminal cases, the 2020 Delhi riots and the Covid crisis -- was questioned. Then came the excise policy case, bringing Kejriwal and senior leaders like Manish Sisodia into major legal trouble. Both were arrested and jailed.

For a party that had built itself on moral clarity, this was damaging in a way that went beyond politics.

The image began to shift. The distance between what was promised and what was being seen grew wider. Even issues like the controversy around official residences fed into that perception.

And then came the setback that made it impossible to ignore. It could not win any of the seven Lok Sabha seats in Delhi. Also, the 2025 Delhi elections did not go the way the party had expected. A party that once seemed unshakeable in the national capital lost ground.

People who overwhelmingly repeatedly voted for Kejriwal expressed their anger by booing him out of the New Delhi Assembly seat -- which had been his stronghold since the last three elections.

For Kejriwal, it was not just an electoral loss -- it was a signal. Public trust, once dented, does not quietly return and should not be taken for granted.

Since then, more cracks have shown. Leaders have left. Some have spoken. Others have simply walked away. What was once projected as a shared movement now appears fragile. AAP was not meant to be just another political party. It was a belief that politics could be cleaner, more accountable, transparent, and less cynical.

People did not just vote for it; they invested in it. And that is why the disillusionment feels personal.

When a financial scam collapses, people lose money. When a political promise collapses, they lose faith. And faith, once shaken, does not return easily.

The story is still unfolding. Politics rarely ends neatly, and comebacks are always possible. But for those who once stood in protest grounds, believing they were part of something different, the question has not really gone away.

Not loudly, not dramatically -- but quietly, and persistently: Was it a movement that lost its way? Or was it something else all along that aam aadami could not comprehend initially?

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 19 (SocialNews.XYZ) When the results of the women's reservation bill were announced in the Lok Sabha on the evening of April 17, the reaction was immediate -- desks were thumped, slogans filled the air, and the 230 opposition members were on their feet, celebrating. It felt strange, almost uncomfortable to watch. This was a bill many believed could mark a real shift in India's political landscape, yet its defeat was being greeted with applause rather than disappointment.

There was something unsettling about this. A proposal that promised to alter the landscape of Indian politics -- to finally widen the narrow doorway through which women enter Parliament -- had just been voted down. And still, the opposition was jubilant. It felt less like politics and more like a moment where instinct overtook introspection.

At one level, the reaction is not difficult to decode. For the first time in over a decade, the government led by Prime Minister Narendra Modi had been handed a clear legislative setback in the Lok Sabha. For the opposition, led by Rahul Gandhi, this was the moment to claim political ground -- an opportunity to stall what the government had positioned as a flagship reform.

But politics, when reduced purely to scorecards, often forgets the people it is meant to serve. In that moment, the larger significance of the bill appeared to recede. This was not just another piece of legislation. It was an idea that had been deferred for decades. The promise of reserving seats for women in Parliament has hovered over India's legislative history like an unfinished sentence -- spoken of, debated, postponed, revived, and now, once again, stalled.

The opposition has tried to articulate its reasons. Rahul Gandhi and his allies -- including M.K. Stalin, Akhilesh Yadav, and Mamata Banerjee -- argued that linking the bill to delimitation raises deeper structural concerns. They contended that any redrawing of constituencies tied to population changes could alter the balance of political power across states, potentially disadvantaging those that have managed population growth more effectively, particularly in the South.

The resistance was not merely rhetorical. M.K. Stalin, holding a constitutional post, burnt a copy of the bill and asked his MPs to wear black as a mark of dissent. His argument centred on the fear that population-based delimitation would penalise southern states by reducing their relative representation in Parliament. Mamata Banerjee, too, opposed the linkage, going so far as to call it a "conspiracy" that could eventually be used to manipulate electoral rolls and pave the way for measures like the National Register of Citizens.

These concerns were firmly countered by the government. Union Home Minister Amit Shah dismissed them as a deliberately constructed narrative aimed at derailing the reform. He attempted to allay fears with numbers, pointing out that the five southern states -- Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Telangana, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala -- currently hold 129 Lok Sabha seats, accounting for 23.76 per cent of the total 543. Even with a hypothetical 50 per cent increase in seats, he argued, their share would rise proportionately, reaching 195 seats, thereby preserving their political weight.

On paper, the argument appears reasonable. But politics is rarely settled on paper alone. The Rahul Gandhi-led opposition remained unconvinced. Akhilesh Yadav went a step further, remarking that even if the BJP were to promise a woman Prime Minister, he would not take it at face value.

In downing the bill, the opposition may have won a tactical momentary victory. But it sidestepped what could have been a moment of reckoning. Beyond the procedural disputes and political positioning lay a simple reality -- women remain significantly underrepresented in India's highest decision-making body.

The numbers tell the story. From just 22 women in the first Lok Sabha to 78 in the 17th -- the highest ever -- the trajectory shows progress, but at a pace that is difficult to defend. The current House, with around 75 women members, still falls far short of reflecting a country where women constitute nearly half the population.

The proposed reform, particularly if tied to a future expansion of seats, could have transformed that equation. With the Lok Sabha potentially growing to over 800 members, nearly 272 seats could be reserved for women. That is not a marginal adjustment; it is a structural shift -- one that could redefine participation, reshape policy priorities, and alter the very grammar of representation.

And that is precisely why this moment feels heavier than a routine legislative defeat. It is not just about what was rejected, but about what has been postponed yet again. It also raises uncomfortable questions for the Congress-led opposition.

Indian politics has never lacked powerful women leaders. From Indira Gandhi to J. Jayalalithaa, individual success stories have been celebrated. But these exceptions coexist with a system that remains structurally skewed. The rise of a few does not compensate for the absence of many.

Perhaps that is why the opposition's celebration in the House felt jarring. It seemed disconnected from the larger goal. Governments will come and go. Victories will be claimed and losses absorbed. But some ideas demand a politics that rises above immediate advantage -- one that recognises when the stakes extend beyond electoral gain.

It is here that the Rahul Gandhi-led opposition appears to have fallen short.

Reforms of this magnitude require more than legislative numbers; they require political trust and accommodation. The question now remains unavoidable -- should a reform of this scale become collateral damage in a broader political contest?

The image of that April 17 evening -- desks thumping, slogans echoing -- will eventually fade into the archive of parliamentary theatre. But the discomfort it leaves behind should not lessen because beneath the noise was a quieter truth -- an opportunity slipped through once again.

India does not lack capable women leaders. It lacks enough of them in the rooms where decisions are made. And until that changes, every delay carries a cost -- not measured in votes or victories, but in voices that remain unheard.

The real tragedy of April 17 is not that the government lost a bill. Sadly, the country lost an opportunity which women across India continue to wait for. The thumping of the desks in celebration by the opposition will continue to echo for a long time.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 12 (SocialNews.XYZ) What could be more ironic -- or more unsettling -- than a country long accused of harbouring terrorists presenting itself as a venue for peace talks? The contradiction is not just hard to ignore; it is even harder to justify.

It becomes sharper when one considers that the United States -- a nation that suffered one of the deadliest terrorist attacks in modern history -- now finds itself relying, directly or indirectly, on Pakistan to facilitate pathways to peace. This is the same Pakistan that sheltered Osama bin Laden, the mastermind of 9/11, in Abbottabad, within walking distance of a military academy.

There is something deeply jarring about this spectacle -- Pakistan stepping into the role of diplomatic host and attempting to recast itself as a credible broker of dialogue and stability. But the fact is that the very tools required to foster trust -- consistency and credibility -- have rarely been associated with a country whose footprint appears repeatedly in the shadow of global terror.

For a country carved out in 1947 on religious lines, Pakistan's trajectory has been shaped less by internal consolidation and more by external hostility, particularly towards India. The record is not contested -- four wars, decades of cross-border tensions, and a persistent reliance on non-state actors. These are not fragments of a distant past; they continue to define the region's fragile security even today.

The most recent reminder came on April 22, 2025, in Pahalgam, where terrorists gunned down 25 tourists and a local pony operator in a brutal attack that shocked the world. The outrage was immediate and global, including from the United States.

For decades, Pakistan's international reputation has been dogged by accusations of deep-state links with extremist groups. These concerns have extended far beyond South Asia. From Afghanistan to incidents in the West, investigative trails have often pointed towards operatives, funding pipelines, or ideological networks with roots in Pakistan. Denials have been routine, but the pattern has been difficult to dismiss.

Nothing illustrates this more starkly than the events of September 11, 2001. Nineteen hijackers carried out coordinated attacks on the United States, bringing down the World Trade Center towers, striking the Pentagon, and crashing a fourth plane in Pennsylvania. Nearly 3,000 lives were lost in an act that reshaped global security.

The investigations that followed raised troubling questions. Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, the principal architect of the attacks, was captured in Pakistan -- not in a remote hideout, but in an urban setting. Osama Bin Laden's presence in Abbottabad only deepened the sense of disbelief over how such figures could remain undetected for so long.

Which makes the present moment all the more puzzling.

Consider Donald Trump's own record. In 2018, as President, he openly accused Pakistan of "lies and deceit", questioning the billions of dollars in American aid and alleging that Islamabad had offered safe havens to terrorists while taking US support.

Fast forward to now, and the shift in tone is striking. Trump appears to have rediscovered Pakistan as a partner. He has publicly praised General Asim Munir -- even calling him a "favourite Field Marshal" -- despite the general's record of provocative rhetoric rooted in religion and region, including remarks made shortly before the April 2025 Pahalgam attack.

India responded with Operation Sindoor, a calibrated crackdown on terror networks. Trump, however, chose a different framing -- claiming credit for easing tensions between New Delhi and Islamabad and even floating the idea of a Nobel Peace Prize for himself. In doing so, he has, in effect, legitimised a state he once described as complicit in terrorism and has positioned it as a broker in a conflict that has put the whole world in peril.

What this moment exposes is not diplomacy, but a collapse of political consistency -- particularly in Washington. The same leader who once warned the world about Pakistan's duplicity now appears willing to overlook it.

The reality, however, remains unchanged. Pakistan has not fundamentally dismantled the infrastructure that has long defined its global reputation. Networks that have destabilised regions and claimed innocent lives continue to cast a long shadow. From sheltering Osama Bin Laden to enabling cross-border terror, the record is neither thin nor ambiguous. But, unfortunately, all this is being conveniently set aside.

And so, we arrive at a troubling paradox -- a country with such a history being projected as a facilitator of peace, while the world's most powerful nation looks the other way, conveniently sidestepping its evil deeds, such as the 26/11 Mumbai attacks, in which American citizens were also killed; the 2019 Pulwama attack; 2001 Indian Parliament attack, or the terrorism in Kashmir where thousands have died and lakhs uprooted.

The message this sends is dangerous. It suggests that accountability is negotiable, that inconvenient histories can be rewritten, and that strategic utility can outweigh sustained patterns of behaviour.

By legitimising Pakistan without demanding irreversible change, the US risks strengthening the very ecosystem it claims to fight, which is the terrorist supporting regimes. Peace, after all, cannot be outsourced to a state that has so often been part of the problem.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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Dhaka: At a time when antisemitism is resurging across continents — manifesting in rhetoric, violence, and organised incitement — the response of democratic governments remains uneven and, at times, troublingly inconsistent. While some nations continue to permit the entry and public amplification of extremist clerics, others are beginning to recognise the dangers posed by such figures. Australia’s recent actions against foreign preachers accused of spreading anti-Jewish hatred offer a notable example of the latter — and raise urgent questions about global standards in confronting hate.

For years, Islamist preachers have operated across Western societies through conferences, religious gatherings, and diaspora networks, often using these platforms to promote hostility toward Jews, Israel, and non-Muslim communities more broadly. These messages — frequently framed as theological or political commentary — have, in many cases, crossed into explicit antisemitic conspiracy theories and dehumanising rhetoric.

Against this backdrop, Australia has taken steps that signal a shift toward stricter scrutiny.

On April 5, Australian authorities cancelled the visa of Bangladeshi preacher Shaykh Ahmadullah over alleged antisemitic remarks, effectively preventing him from proceeding with planned speaking engagements in the country. Australia’s Department of Home Affairs is currently reviewing whether to impose a permanent ban, with a decision expected imminently.

The decision followed controversy surrounding Ahmadullah’s statements about Jewish people. In a video cited by 'The Telegraph', he suggested that even minor conflicts should be viewed through the lens of a supposed “Jewish conspiracy”, further alleging that Jews act as hidden orchestrators behind global unrest. Such rhetoric echoes long-standing antisemitic tropes that have historically fueled prejudice and violence.

Ahmadullah’s case is not isolated. Earlier, another Bangladeshi preacher, Mizanur Rahman Azhari, was deported from Australia midway through a nationwide speaking tour after past statements resurfaced. Azhari has described Jews as the “biggest terrorists in the world” and referred to Adolf Hitler as a “divine punishment” against them — remarks that go far beyond political criticism and enter the realm of explicit incitement and historical distortion.

Events featuring Azhari had been organised by several groups, including the Islamic Practice and Dawah Circle (IPDC). According to 'The Daily Telegraph', Azhari — despite having previously been barred from entering the United Kingdom — had been granted a visitor visa to deliver sermons in Sydney and other major Australian cities.

Reports by 'Daily Mail' indicate that Azhari commands an audience of approximately 10 million followers online, underscoring the scale at which such messages can spread across borders. His Australian tour, branded as the “Legacy of Faith” series, included scheduled appearances in Brisbane, Melbourne, Sydney, and Canberra, reflecting a coordinated effort to engage Muslim communities across the country.

The content of Azhari’s past sermons has drawn significant concern. In a 2023 address delivered in the United States, he reportedly promoted a range of antisemitic conspiracy theories, including claims that Jews were responsible for global crisis such as the spread of AIDS. He also expressed admiration for Hitler’s actions against Jews — statements that not only distort historical reality but also risk normalising genocidal rhetoric among audiences.

Azhari is also reported to have links with Jamaat-e-Islami, an ideological offshoot of the Muslim Brotherhood. His international engagements have included invitations from organisations such as the Muslim Ummah of North America (MUNA), where he appeared alongside figures including Nihad Awad, Executive Director of the Council on American-Islamic Relations (CAIR). Despite the controversies surrounding his views, US authorities did not revoke his visa or prevent his participation in such events.

This discrepancy in responses has not gone unnoticed. The Middle East Forum reported that Bangladeshi-American and other Bengali activists expressed concern over the decision by US border authorities to admit Azhari, allowing him to speak at an Islamist conference in Philadelphia.

UK-based activist and lawyer Mufassil Islam has similarly questioned how individuals with well-documented records of inflammatory rhetoric are permitted entry into Western countries. He has described Azhari as a “hate preacher” who has called for violence against ex-Muslims and promoted the subjugation of Jews and Christians.

Further allegations suggest that Azhari maintains close associations with Zakir Naik, an Indian Islamist figure wanted by Indian authorities in connection with terror financing — adding another layer of concern regarding networks and ideological influence.

Notably, the United Kingdom has taken a firmer stance in the past. In 2021, British MP Bob Blackman told the House of Commons that Azhari was spreading a “message of hatred against Jews and Hindus,” formally identifying him as a hate preacher. Subsequently, British authorities revoked his visa, and officials in Doha, Qatar, prevented him from boarding a flight to the UK.

Australia’s recent actions, therefore, place it among a smaller group of nations willing to act decisively when confronted with evidence of extremist rhetoric. At a time when Jewish communities worldwide are increasingly concerned about rising antisemitism—both online and offline — such measures carry significance beyond domestic policy. They signal a willingness to draw clear boundaries between freedom of expression and the promotion of hatred.

Yet the broader international picture remains uneven. Inconsistent enforcement allows individuals accused of spreading hate to move between jurisdictions, continuing to reach audiences and amplify their messages. In an era defined by digital connectivity, the consequences of such inconsistencies are magnified, as rhetoric delivered in one country can quickly resonate across continents.

For Israel and Jewish communities globally, this issue is not abstract. The normalisation of antisemitic narratives — whether framed as conspiracy theories or political grievances — has tangible consequences, contributing to an environment in which hostility can escalate into discrimination or violence.

Australia’s example raises an important question for policymakers worldwide: should the threshold for action be uniform when it comes to individuals accused of promoting hatred against identifiable groups? And if so, what mechanisms are needed to ensure that such standards are consistently applied?

Ultimately, the challenge is not only about immigration policy or border control. It is about safeguarding democratic societies from ideologies that seek to undermine coexistence by promoting division and hostility. Governments that fail to act risk allowing such narratives to take root, with long-term consequences that extend far beyond any single speech or event.

Australia has drawn a line. Whether others will follow remains an open — and increasingly urgent — question.

(The writer is an award-winning journalist, writer, and editor of the newspaper Blitz. He specialises in counterterrorism and regional geopolitics. Views expressed are personal)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 5 (SocialNews.XYZ) Picture the forests of Bastar in 2013. No roads. No mobile signals. No banks. No schools worth the name. A parallel government, complete with its own courts, its own tax collectors and its own executioners, ruled these jungles by absolute terror. Tribal families buried their dead in silence, fearing that grief itself might draw suspicion. Security forces moved in convoys because moving alone meant dying.

India, the world's largest democracy, had effectively ceded sovereign territory to a Maoist militia operating on the instructions of a long-dead Chinese dictator. Fifty-seven years of this. Twenty thousand dead. Twelve crore citizens held hostage to an insurgency that previous governments had quietly accepted as a permanent feature of the national landscape. Then, PM Narendra Modi assumed office. And everything changed.

Sixty years of failure: The Inheritance PM Modi walked into

Naxalism did not persist because it was undefeatable. It persisted because defeating it required political will that successive governments refused to summon. Congress, which governed India for sixty of its seventy-five post-Independence years, found tribal grievance more useful as a narrative than as a problem to be solved. The result was catastrophic: 20,000 lives lost, 5,000 of them security personnel, and 12 crore citizens permanently outside the constitutional tent. When PM Modi inherited this in 2014, he inherited not just an insurgency. He inherited half a century of institutional betrayal.

The Masterstroke: PM Modi fuses welfare and security into one doctrine

PM Modi's decisive contribution was an insight that sounds simple but had eluded every predecessor: tribal welfare and national security are not separate problems. They are one. Every previous government ran security operations in one lane and development in another, rarely coordinated, frequently working against each other. PM Modi fused them into a single, non-negotiable doctrine.

For the first time, the constitutional promise reached the actual doorstep. Pucca houses. Gas cylinders. Clean water. Jan Dhan accounts. Food security. Insurance. The state did not merely send in forces. It sent in the Constitution, household by household, village by village. PM Modi understood the truth that had been studiously avoided for decades: an insurgency feeds on the vacuum the state leaves behind. Fill that vacuum completely, and the insurgency starves. Twelve years of that clarity delivered what sixty years of managed ambivalence could not.

HM Amit Shah: The Man who set a deadline and kept it

Strategic vision needs an executor of rare quality. In Home Minister Amit Shah, PM Modi found one. Amit Shah brought to the Home Ministry a combination of a commander's decisiveness paired with a strategist's astuteness and patience.

In August 2024, HM Shah announced publicly that India would be Naxal-free by March 31, 2026. Not a hope or an aspiration. A hard, public commitment. A deadline set by a minister with an unbroken record of delivery concentrates resources, compresses timelines and sends an unmistakable message to every wavering cadre in the forest: the endgame has begun. Come in now.

A Parliamentary address that history will record

Home Minister Amit Shah's ninety-minute address to Parliament on March 30 was one of the most commanding ministerial performances in the Lok Sabha in recent memory. Having personally reviewed over two thousand pro-Naxal articles in the preceding six days, he cited operation dates, committee structures, and surrender numbers with prosecutorial precision. He paid tribute to the fallen with dignity, without exploiting their sacrifice for effect. PM Modi described it as a speech filled with important facts, historical context and a decade of governmental effort. That commendation, from a Prime Minister, said everything.

The numbers that no propagandist can spin away

The data speaks without equivocation. In three years: 706 Naxalites neutralised, over 4,800 surrendered. In 2025 alone: 270 neutralised, 680 arrested, 1,225 laid down arms. The extremist Maoist Politburo dismantled: 12 top leaders killed, the sole remaining fugitive in active surrender talks. The dreaded 27-member state committee of the principal affected region wiped out entirely. Over the decade, more than 8,000 cadres have abandoned the armed movement.

The development record is equally unambiguous. 14,902 kilometres of roads built through the terrain of Maoist areas kept deliberately inaccessible for decades. 8,640 mobile towers commissioned, ending the communications blackout that insurgents weaponised for control. 179 Eklavya Residential Schools now functional. 5,899 post offices with banking services opened in LWE districts. These are not statistics. They are the Constitution, delivered at scale, across the most forgotten terrain in India.

Compassion as a weapon: Naming the propaganda for what it is

Even as this transformation unfolded on the ground, international platforms aligned with Maoist networks described security operations as genocide and portrayed killed armed commanders as martyrs of tribal India. HM Amit Shah exposed this with one precise observation: not one of those two thousand articles mourned the widows of security personnel. Not one grieved for the civilians killed in Maoist ambushes. Not one acknowledged the tribal families whose children were conscripted at gunpoint.

That silence is structural, not accidental. The Naxals never represented Adivasi India. It required the Adivasi suffering to remain unresolved to justify its own existence. Every road built and school opened under PM Modi was a direct blow to that argument. Selective compassion for armed insurgents, with none for their victims, is not humanitarianism. It is insurgent propaganda wearing a humanitarian mask.

Consolidating the win: The work that must not stop

Rehabilitation of surrendered cadres must be sustained with full seriousness. The remaining two affected districts must be brought entirely into the national mainstream. Development momentum in Bastar must not slow once the security headlines move on. The lesson of this decade is irreversible: comprehensive, consistent governance is the most powerful counter-insurgency instrument ever devised. That lesson must now become permanent policy, not merely operational memory.

A constitutional debt, finally settled

The forests of Bastar now have roads, schools and mobile signals. Children there will grow up knowing the Indian state as a protector, not a predator. The Maoist Politburo has been dismantled, cadre by cadre, committee by committee. On March 31, 2026, HM Amit Shah stood before Parliament and closed a chapter that sixty years of governments had chosen to leave open.

PM Narendra Modi provided the structural vision and insight that national security and the welfare of India's most forgotten citizens are one indivisible obligation. HM Amit Shah provided the operational architecture, the public deadline, and the executive will to deliver it.

Together, in twelve years, the courageous leadership and vision of PM Narendra Modi, with diligent efforts and execution of HM Amit Shah has settled a constitutional debt that had accumulated over sixty years. That is not a political achievement. That is a civilisational one.

(The author is a senior advocate practising in the Supreme Court of India)

Source: IANS

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New Delhi, April 5 (SocialNews.XYZ) As the US-Iran conflict drags into its second month -- unsettling markets, testing alliances -- one thing is becoming clear: the world does not need longer wars. It needs smarter outcomes.

That is why it is worth revisiting a decision closer home -- one that, at the time, drew sharp criticism from the Congress-led opposition. When the Modi government chose to halt Operation Sindoor soon after achieving its objective, the opposition was quick to call it hasty, even short-sighted.

In hindsight, that criticism now feels more reactive and political than reasoned. Because strategy -- especially in matters of national security -- is rarely about how things look in the moment. It is about clarity of purpose, and just as importantly, about knowing when that purpose has been served. Not every show of strength needs to be stretched out to prove a point.

India could have extended Operation Sindoor (May 7, 2025 – May 10, 2025). It had the operational capacity to escalate, broaden the scope, or extend the engagement. It chose not to. The objective was clear, and once met, the operation was halted. Within days, Pakistan had been pushed onto the back foot, seeking relief and a ceasefire agreement. That was the outcome India was aiming for.

And perhaps that is what made it uncomfortable for some -- there was no prolonged build-up, no dramatic escalation, no extended theatre. Just a swift, contained result.

Now, shift the lens to West Asia. Despite repeated assertions of control, the US appears increasingly caught in a conflict that is deepening -- widening rather than settling.

US President Donald Trump continues to project confidence, but the ground reality tells a more complicated story. Iran, for its part, has shown that it retains the capacity to respond. The back-and-forth continues, and with it, the uncertainty.

The unease around the Strait of Hormuz says enough. The disruption is sending ripples across global energy markets. That is the problem with prolonged conflicts: they rarely stay contained, and their consequences travel far beyond the immediate theatre.

What is also becoming evident is the hesitation among America’s traditional allies. There is support, yes -- but not quite the kind that translates into deep involvement. There is caution, a degree of distance, and in some cases, visible discomfort.

French President Emmanuel Macron, in his recent remarks, articulated this shift rather clearly. His call for a “coalition of independence” reflects a growing sentiment -- that countries are no longer entirely comfortable being tied too closely to dominant power blocs. Strategic space matters, perhaps more now than before.

For India, this is not unfamiliar ground. Strategic autonomy has long been part of its approach, though the way it is exercised has evolved. From non-alignment to a more flexible, interest-driven engagement, India has gradually built a framework where it can work with multiple partners without being locked into any single axis.

In the middle of the current crisis, New Delhi has largely stayed that course. It has resisted the pressure to take overt sides, while ensuring that its own interests -- particularly in energy flows -- are not compromised. It is this approach that has allowed India to maintain steady movement through critical routes. Several Indian vessels have continued to pass through the Hormuz Strait despite the prevailing uncertainty.

Diplomatic engagement continues, and where required, support has been extended -- quietly, without much noise. And that quietness is easy to miss, especially in a world that often equates visibility with effectiveness.

The longer the conflict continues, the sharper the contrast becomes. Prolonged offensives tend to create more variables than they resolve. They stretch resources, test alliances, and introduce risks that are difficult to anticipate, let alone manage. Swift, clearly defined actions, on the other hand, tend to leave less room for escalation.

Operation Sindoor may not have been widely acknowledged globally, but it demonstrated a principle that is hard to ignore -- effectiveness is not measured by duration, but by whether the objective was achieved. Staying longer in a conflict does not necessarily translate into a better outcome; it often does the opposite.

The US and the rest of the world are experiencing this. India understood this a long time ago.

If the past few weeks have shown anything, it is this -- drawn-out wars rarely produce clean endings. They create layers of uncertainty -- economic, political, and strategic -- that take far longer to unwind than the conflict itself.

Decisiveness, restraint, and clarity are often underestimated in moments of high tension. They do not make for dramatic headlines. Ultimately, wars are not won by how long they last, but by how decisively they are concluded.

And that is where India’s approach begins to stand out. Operation Sindoor is perhaps its clearest recent example.

(Deepika Bhan can be contacted at deepika.b@ians.in)

Source: IANS

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